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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion .github/workflows/pullfrog.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
with:
fetch-depth: 1
- name: Run agent
uses: pullfrog/pullfrog@3c58d31073422cc1b9573f58b5dbadb7a4914715 # v0
uses: pullfrog/pullfrog@44b58efe7fe431053c58aafa05e51e190f969685 # v0

Check failure on line 29 in .github/workflows/pullfrog.yml

View check run for this annotation

Secuarden AI / secuarden/scan

Unpinned/Unverified Third-Party GitHub Action Commit SHA [high]

The workflow pins the `pullfrog/pullfrog` action to commit SHA `44b58efe7fe431053c58aafa05e51e190f969685`, replacing the previous SHA `3c58d31073422cc1b9573f58b5dbadb7a4914715`. While using a full commit SHA is better than a mutable tag, the new SHA has not been reviewed for supply-chain integrity. If the `pullfrog/pullfrog` repository (a third-party, non-audited action) has been compromised or if this SHA represents a malicious or unreviewed commit, the action runs with access to repository secrets and the full workflow environment. This is particularly concerning because: (1) the action receives `inputs.prompt` which could contain sensitive data, (2) the `env` block may expose additional secrets, and (3) the repository context flags the CI/CD pipeline path as high-risk (`infra/ci/.github/workflows/` with score 74). The transition from one unverified SHA to another without documented review or verification constitutes a supply-chain risk. Remediation: 1. Verify the new commit SHA `44b58efe7fe431053c58aafa05e51e190f969685` against the official `pullfrog/pullfrog` repository and confirm it corresponds to a tagged, reviewed release. 2. Document the verification process (e.g., via a comment referencing the release notes or a CODEOWNERS approval). 3. Audit the action's source code at this SHA for any secret exfiltration, unexpected network calls, or privilege escalation. 4. Restrict the action's permissions using `permissions:` at the job level to the minimum required. 5. Ensure no unmasked secrets are passed via `inputs.prompt` or `env`. 6. Consider using a dependency review action or a tool like `step-security/harden-runner` to monitor action behavior at runtime.

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⚠️ High: Unpinned/Unverified Third-Party GitHub Action Commit SHA

🎟️ Issue Explanation

The workflow pins the pullfrog/pullfrog action to commit SHA 44b58efe7fe431053c58aafa05e51e190f969685, replacing the previous SHA 3c58d31073422cc1b9573f58b5dbadb7a4914715. While using a full commit SHA is better than a mutable tag, the new SHA has not been reviewed for supply-chain integrity. If the pullfrog/pullfrog repository (a third-party, non-audited action) has been compromised or if this SHA represents a malicious or unreviewed commit, the action runs with access to repository secrets and the full workflow environment. This is particularly concerning because: (1) the action receives inputs.prompt which could contain sensitive data, (2) the env block may expose additional secrets, and (3) the repository context flags the CI/CD pipeline path as high-risk (infra/ci/.github/workflows/ with score 74). The transition from one unverified SHA to another without documented review or verification constitutes a supply-chain risk.

🛠️ Actions

  • @secuarden-ai /fix - Generate remediation code for this issue
  • @secuarden-ai /explain - Learn why this matters and potential impact
  • @secuarden-ai /ignore [reason] - Dismiss this finding
  • @secuarden-ai /review - Submit a reasoned assessment and request a rescan

🔐 Secuarden Security Review • Finding: SEC_ccd717609192

with:
prompt: ${{ inputs.prompt }}
env:
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