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build(deps): bump pullfrog/pullfrog from 0.1.123 to 0.1.130 - #1108
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dependabot[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
dependabot[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
dependabot[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
Secuarden AI / secuarden/scan
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Nov 18, 2026 in 1m 33s
Secuarden Review
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Check failure on line 29 in .github/workflows/pullfrog.yml
secuarden-ai / secuarden/scan
Unpinned/Unverified Third-Party GitHub Action Commit SHA [high]
The workflow pins the `pullfrog/pullfrog` action to commit SHA `44b58efe7fe431053c58aafa05e51e190f969685`, replacing the previous SHA `3c58d31073422cc1b9573f58b5dbadb7a4914715`. While using a full commit SHA is better than a mutable tag, the new SHA has not been reviewed for supply-chain integrity. If the `pullfrog/pullfrog` repository (a third-party, non-audited action) has been compromised or if this SHA represents a malicious or unreviewed commit, the action runs with access to repository secrets and the full workflow environment. This is particularly concerning because: (1) the action receives `inputs.prompt` which could contain sensitive data, (2) the `env` block may expose additional secrets, and (3) the repository context flags the CI/CD pipeline path as high-risk (`infra/ci/.github/workflows/` with score 74). The transition from one unverified SHA to another without documented review or verification constitutes a supply-chain risk.
Remediation: 1. Verify the new commit SHA `44b58efe7fe431053c58aafa05e51e190f969685` against the official `pullfrog/pullfrog` repository and confirm it corresponds to a tagged, reviewed release. 2. Document the verification process (e.g., via a comment referencing the release notes or a CODEOWNERS approval). 3. Audit the action's source code at this SHA for any secret exfiltration, unexpected network calls, or privilege escalation. 4. Restrict the action's permissions using `permissions:` at the job level to the minimum required. 5. Ensure no unmasked secrets are passed via `inputs.prompt` or `env`. 6. Consider using a dependency review action or a tool like `step-security/harden-runner` to monitor action behavior at runtime.
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