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Fix truncation and noDegenerate bypasses in wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData #11017

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Fix truncation and noDegenerate bypasses in wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData #11017

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fcb13ed
fix f7302 pkcs7
miyazakh Jul 30, 2026
72c4aa5
additional fix
miyazakh Jul 30, 2026
a600695
tests: remove bare scope block in PKCS7 DegenerateMinimal stream test
miyazakh Jul 31, 2026
8777c2b
pkcs7: fix VerifySignedData stall when signerInfos is missing entirely
miyazakh Jul 31, 2026
59c4c70
pkcs7: don't zero-cap stage 3 expected for indefinite-length bundles
miyazakh Jul 31, 2026
472ec62
Addressed review comments
miyazakh Aug 5, 2026
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289 changes: 279 additions & 10 deletions tests/api/test_pkcs7.c
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -6285,19 +6285,15 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_TruncEContentTag(void)
/*
* SignedData bundle truncated at the certificates [0] IMPLICIT tag.
* Verifies that the parser rejects the malformed input rather than
* dereferencing past the end of the buffer.
*
* TODO: limited to NO_PKCS7_STREAM because the streaming parser's stage 3
* early-exit check (pkcs7.c near line 6594) accepts any bundle
* whose remaining footer is < 6 bytes as a successful degenerate end,
* so the bounds check at line 6765 is unreachable in streaming mode.
* Drop the NO_PKCS7_STREAM gate if/when the early-exit check becomes
* more accurate.
* dereferencing past the end of the buffer. Runs in both streaming and
* NO_PKCS7_STREAM builds: the streaming parser's stage 3 early-exit check
* used to accept any bundle whose remaining footer was < 6 bytes as a
* successful degenerate end, silently accepting this truncated input.
*/
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_TruncCertSetTag(void)
{
EXPECT_DECLS;
#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && defined(NO_PKCS7_STREAM)
#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7)
PKCS7* pkcs7 = NULL;

WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK_STATIC byte der[] = {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -6337,7 +6333,280 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_TruncCertSetTag(void)
ExpectIntNE(wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData(pkcs7, der, derSz), 0);
wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);

#endif /* HAVE_PKCS7 && NO_PKCS7_STREAM */
#endif /* HAVE_PKCS7 */
return EXPECT_RESULT();
}

/*
* SignedData bundle that is a genuine, non-truncated degenerate
* (certs-only) bundle: no certificates, no CRLs, and an empty signerInfos
* SET ("31 00") closing the bundle right after the content. This is the
* shortest legitimate ending the stage 3 tail check in the streaming
* parser can see, and must still succeed after fixing that check to reject
* truncated bundles.
*/
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_DegenerateMinimal(void)
{
EXPECT_DECLS;
#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7)
PKCS7* pkcs7 = NULL;
#ifndef NO_PKCS7_STREAM
int ret;
word32 idx;
#endif

WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK_STATIC byte der[] = {
/* outer ContentInfo SEQUENCE (99 bytes content) */
0x30, 0x63,
/* contentType OID signedData */
0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02,
/* [0] EXPLICIT (86 bytes content) */
0xA0, 0x56,
/* SignedData SEQUENCE (84 bytes content) */
0x30, 0x54,
/* version INTEGER 1 */
0x02, 0x01, 0x01,
/* digestAlgorithms SET (empty - degenerate) */
0x31, 0x00,
/* encapContentInfo SEQUENCE (75 bytes content) */
0x30, 0x4B,
/* eContentType OID 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1 (data) */
0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01,
/* eContent [0] EXPLICIT (62 bytes content) */
0xA0, 0x3E,
/* OCTET STRING (60 bytes content) */
0x04, 0x3C,
0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F,
0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F,
0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27,
0x28, 0x29, 0x2A, 0x2B, 0x2C, 0x2D, 0x2E, 0x2F,
0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37,
0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x3B,
/* signerInfos SET (empty - degenerate end) */
0x31, 0x00
};
word32 derSz = (word32)sizeof(der);

/* single-shot call */
ExpectNotNull(pkcs7 = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, testDevId));
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_Init(pkcs7, HEAP_HINT, INVALID_DEVID), 0);
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(pkcs7, NULL, 0), 0);
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData(pkcs7, der, derSz), 0);
if (pkcs7 != NULL) {
ExpectIntEQ(pkcs7->contentSz, 60);
ExpectNotNull(pkcs7->content);
}
wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
pkcs7 = NULL;

#ifndef NO_PKCS7_STREAM
/* same bundle fed one byte at a time */
ExpectNotNull(pkcs7 = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, testDevId));
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_Init(pkcs7, HEAP_HINT, INVALID_DEVID), 0);
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(pkcs7, NULL, 0), 0);

ret = WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(WC_PKCS7_WANT_READ_E);
for (idx = 0; idx < derSz && ret != 0; idx++) {
ret = wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData(pkcs7, der + idx, 1);
if (ret < 0 && ret != WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(WC_PKCS7_WANT_READ_E)) {
break;
}
}
ExpectIntEQ(ret, 0);
if (pkcs7 != NULL) {
ExpectIntEQ(pkcs7->contentSz, 60);
ExpectNotNull(pkcs7->content);
}
wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
#endif /* !NO_PKCS7_STREAM */

#endif /* HAVE_PKCS7 */
return EXPECT_RESULT();
}

/*
* Same shape as test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_DegenerateMinimal, but the
* final 2 bytes are "31 01" instead of "31 00": a signerInfos SET claiming
* one byte of content that the buffer never supplies. Must be rejected,
* not treated as a successful degenerate end.
*/
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_TruncSignerInfosTag(void)
{
EXPECT_DECLS;
#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7)
PKCS7* pkcs7 = NULL;

WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK_STATIC byte der[] = {
0x30, 0x63,
0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02,
0xA0, 0x56,
0x30, 0x54,
0x02, 0x01, 0x01,
0x31, 0x00,
0x30, 0x4B,
0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01,
0xA0, 0x3E,
0x04, 0x3C,
0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F,
0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F,
0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27,
0x28, 0x29, 0x2A, 0x2B, 0x2C, 0x2D, 0x2E, 0x2F,
0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37,
0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x3B,
/* signerInfos SET claims 1 byte of content, buffer ends here */
0x31, 0x01
};
word32 derSz = (word32)sizeof(der);

ExpectNotNull(pkcs7 = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, testDevId));
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_Init(pkcs7, HEAP_HINT, INVALID_DEVID), 0);
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(pkcs7, NULL, 0), 0);
ExpectIntNE(wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData(pkcs7, der, derSz), 0);

@wolfSSL-Fenrir-bot wolfSSL-Fenrir-bot Jul 31, 2026

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🟠 [Medium] TruncSignerInfosTag test does not catch WC_PKCS7_WANT_READ_E stall · Weak or missing assertions

The 31 01 signerInfos header (declared length 1, 0 bytes available) makes the default streaming build's single-shot call return WC_PKCS7_WANT_READ_E (a stall, not a rejection), yet ExpectIntNE(ret, 0) passes since -270 != 0.

Fix: Add ExpectIntNE(ret, WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(WC_PKCS7_WANT_READ_E)) as done in the sibling NoSignerInfosTag test.

@miyazakh miyazakh Aug 5, 2026

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Confirmed — good catch. ExpectIntNE(ret, 0) was passing trivially since single-shot on this truncated buffer returns WC_PKCS7_WANT_READ_E (-270), not a real rejection. Added the missing ExpectIntNE(ret, WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(WC_PKCS7_WANT_READ_E)), matching NoSignerInfosTag.

That assertion then exposed an actual bug: the STAGE6→STAGE7 transition in PKCS7_VerifySignedData (pkcs7.c) requested the signerInfos content length without capping it against the bundle's remaining declared length, so a truncated SET header stalled forever instead of failing. Fixed by adding the same totalRd >= maxLen zero-cap guard STAGE3 already uses. Verified with full tests/unit.test (0 failures) and testwolfcrypt to rule out regressions in the encode/decode streaming paths.

wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);

#endif /* HAVE_PKCS7 */
return EXPECT_RESULT();
}

/*
* Same shape again, but the signerInfos SET is missing entirely: the
* buffer ends right after the content, with nothing following. signerInfos
* is a mandatory field, so this must be rejected rather than accepted as
* a bundle with no more elements.
*/
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_NoSignerInfosTag(void)
{
EXPECT_DECLS;
#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7)
PKCS7* pkcs7 = NULL;
#ifndef NO_PKCS7_STREAM
int ret;
word32 idx;
#endif

WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK_STATIC byte der[] = {
0x30, 0x61,
0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02,
0xA0, 0x54,
0x30, 0x52,
0x02, 0x01, 0x01,
0x31, 0x00,
0x30, 0x4B,
0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01,
0xA0, 0x3E,
0x04, 0x3C,
0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F,
0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F,
0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27,
0x28, 0x29, 0x2A, 0x2B, 0x2C, 0x2D, 0x2E, 0x2F,
0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37,
0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x3B
/* buffer ends here -- no signerInfos SET at all */
};
word32 derSz = (word32)sizeof(der);

/* single-shot: must fail with a real parse error, not WANT_READ_E
* (no more bytes will ever arrive per the outer length) */
ExpectNotNull(pkcs7 = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, testDevId));
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_Init(pkcs7, HEAP_HINT, INVALID_DEVID), 0);
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(pkcs7, NULL, 0), 0);
ExpectIntNE(wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData(pkcs7, der, derSz), 0);
ExpectIntNE(wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData(pkcs7, der, derSz),
WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(WC_PKCS7_WANT_READ_E));
wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
pkcs7 = NULL;

#ifndef NO_PKCS7_STREAM
/* same bundle fed one byte at a time: must not end stuck on
* WANT_READ_E once all available bytes are consumed */
ExpectNotNull(pkcs7 = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, testDevId));
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_Init(pkcs7, HEAP_HINT, INVALID_DEVID), 0);
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(pkcs7, NULL, 0), 0);

ret = WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(WC_PKCS7_WANT_READ_E);
for (idx = 0; idx < derSz && ret != 0; idx++) {
ret = wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData(pkcs7, der + idx, 1);
if (ret < 0 && ret != WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(WC_PKCS7_WANT_READ_E)) {
break;
}
}
ExpectIntNE(ret, 0);
ExpectIntNE(ret, WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(WC_PKCS7_WANT_READ_E));
wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
#endif /* !NO_PKCS7_STREAM */

#endif /* HAVE_PKCS7 */
return EXPECT_RESULT();
}

/*
* SignedData bundle that is well-formed and NOT truncated: digestAlgorithms
* SET contains one real AlgorithmIdentifier (so the early heuristic that
* flags a bundle as degenerate from an empty digestAlgorithms SET does not
* fire), while signerInfos SET is genuinely empty (degenerate, no signer).
* With wc_PKCS7_AllowDegenerate(pkcs7, 0) set, this must be rejected once
* the accurate signerInfos-based degenerate determination runs, not
* silently accepted because the early heuristic missed it.
*/
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_DegenerateNonEmptyDigestAlgos(void)
{
EXPECT_DECLS;
#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7)
PKCS7* pkcs7 = NULL;

WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK_STATIC byte der[] = {
/* outer ContentInfo SEQUENCE (114 bytes content) */
0x30, 0x72,
/* contentType OID signedData */
0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02,
/* [0] EXPLICIT (101 bytes content) */
0xA0, 0x65,
/* SignedData SEQUENCE (99 bytes content) */
0x30, 0x63,
/* version INTEGER 1 */
0x02, 0x01, 0x01,
/* digestAlgorithms SET (15 bytes content) -- one real
* AlgorithmIdentifier (sha256), not empty */
0x31, 0x0F,
0x30, 0x0D,
0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
0x05, 0x00,
/* encapContentInfo SEQUENCE (75 bytes content) */
0x30, 0x4B,
/* eContentType OID 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1 (data) */
0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01,
/* eContent [0] EXPLICIT (62 bytes content) */
0xA0, 0x3E,
/* OCTET STRING (60 bytes content) */
0x04, 0x3C,
0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F,
0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F,
0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27,
0x28, 0x29, 0x2A, 0x2B, 0x2C, 0x2D, 0x2E, 0x2F,
0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37,
0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x3B,
/* signerInfos SET (empty -- genuinely degenerate) */
0x31, 0x00
};
word32 derSz = (word32)sizeof(der);

ExpectNotNull(pkcs7 = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, testDevId));
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_Init(pkcs7, HEAP_HINT, INVALID_DEVID), 0);
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(pkcs7, NULL, 0), 0);
wc_PKCS7_AllowDegenerate(pkcs7, 0);
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData(pkcs7, der, derSz),
PKCS7_NO_SIGNER_E);
wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);

#endif /* HAVE_PKCS7 */
return EXPECT_RESULT();
}

Expand Down
8 changes: 8 additions & 0 deletions tests/api/test_pkcs7.h
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_PKCS7ContentSeq(void);
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_IndefLenOOB(void);
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_TruncEContentTag(void);
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_TruncCertSetTag(void);
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_DegenerateMinimal(void);
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_TruncSignerInfosTag(void);
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_NoSignerInfosTag(void);
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_DegenerateNonEmptyDigestAlgos(void);
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_NoDigestParams(void);


Expand Down Expand Up @@ -133,6 +137,10 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_NoDigestParams(void);
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_IndefLenOOB), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_TruncEContentTag), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_TruncCertSetTag), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_DegenerateMinimal), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_TruncSignerInfosTag), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_NoSignerInfosTag), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_DegenerateNonEmptyDigestAlgos), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_NoDigestParams)

#define TEST_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA_DECLS \
Expand Down
45 changes: 26 additions & 19 deletions wolfcrypt/src/pkcs7.c
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -6391,7 +6391,7 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_ParseSignerInfo(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,

WOLFSSL_ENTER("wc_PKCS7_ParseSignerInfo");
/* require a signer if degenerate case not allowed */
if (inSz == 0 && pkcs7->noDegenerate == 1) {
if (pkcs7->noDegenerate == 1 && (inSz == 0 || degenerate == 1)) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("Set to not allow degenerate cases");
return PKCS7_NO_SIGNER_E;
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -7506,26 +7506,33 @@ static int PKCS7_VerifySignedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, const byte* hashBuf,
pkcs7->content = pkcs7->contentDynamic;
}

/* check if bundle has more elements or footer, if not, set content
* to pkcs7->content and hash to pkcs7->hash.
*
* NOTE: this check returns success whenever fewer than 6 bytes
* follow the content within the outer ContentInfo, which also
* accepts truncated bundles whose footer was cut short (e.g. a
* lone certificates [0] tag with no length). Distinguishing a
* legitimate degenerate end (such as an empty signerInfos SET
* "31 00") from truncated junk would require peeking at the
* remaining bytes or making stage 4's `expected` window smaller.
/* expect data length to be enough to check set and seq of certs,
* but never request more than the bundle has left. The old code
* unconditionally requested this much and silently treated a
* short read here as a successful degenerate end, which also
* accepted a truncated bundle. Capping the request lets stage
* 4/5/6's existing bounds checks and noDegenerate enforcement
* run instead: a genuine short degenerate end (empty signerInfos
* SET) still parses and succeeds, while anything truncated or
* malformed fails there with a real parse error.
*/
if (ret == 0 && pkcs7->stream->maxLen > 0 &&
(pkcs7->stream->maxLen - pkcs7->stream->totalRd)
< ASN_TAG_SZ + MAX_LENGTH_SZ) {

ret = 0;
break;
}
/* expect data length to be enough to check set and seq of certs */
pkcs7->stream->expected = (ASN_TAG_SZ + MAX_LENGTH_SZ) * 2;
if (!pkcs7->stream->indefLen &&
pkcs7->stream->totalRd >= pkcs7->stream->maxLen) {
/* definite-length bundle with no bytes left per the outer
* length: force stage 4's bounds check to fail now instead
* of requesting bytes that will never arrive. For
* indefinite-length (BER) bundles maxLen is only a running
* estimate, so totalRd catching up to it does not mean the
* bundle is actually exhausted. */
pkcs7->stream->expected = 0;
}
else if (pkcs7->stream->totalRd < pkcs7->stream->maxLen &&
pkcs7->stream->expected >
pkcs7->stream->maxLen - pkcs7->stream->totalRd) {
pkcs7->stream->expected =
pkcs7->stream->maxLen - pkcs7->stream->totalRd;
}
Comment on lines 7519 to +7535

@miyazakh miyazakh Jul 31, 2026

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Confirmed. Reproduced with NoSignerInfosTag (bundle truncated exactly at the outer SignedData length, no signerInfos at all): both single-shot and streaming calls returned WC_PKCS7_WANT_READ_E (-270) instead of a deterministic error, and streaming consumed all available bytes without resolving.

Fixed by capping pkcs7->stream->expected to 0 when totalRd >= maxLen, instead of skipping the cap in that case, so stage 4's existing idx >= pkiMsg2Sz bounds check now fires immediately and returns BUFFER_E.

Also strengthened test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_NoSignerInfosTag to assert the return code is not WC_PKCS7_WANT_READ_E (the prior ExpectIntNE(ret, 0) check passed even on the stall), and added a streaming byte-at-a-time variant of the same case.

Fixed in 8777c2b.


#else
/* Break out before content because it can be optional in degenerate
Expand Down
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