feat(app): add OIDC federated app sign-in (start/exchange_token)

README.md

@@ -256,6 +256,31 @@ The session and refresh JWTs should be returned to the caller, and passed with e
 
 Note: the descope_client.saml.start(..) and descope_client.saml.exchange_token(..) functions are DEPRECATED, use the above sso functions instead
 
+### App (Federated Apps)
+
+Plug an [OIDC Federated App](https://docs.descope.com/identity-federation/applications) configured on the [Descope console](https://app.descope.com/applications) into a pre-existing/homegrown login process, with Descope acting as the IDP - a real OAuth2 authorize/token pair. (The console also supports SAML and WS-Fed federated apps, but those are IDP-initiated with no code, no token, and no `exchange_token` step at all - a fundamentally different shape this SDK doesn't cover; only OIDC is supported here.)
+
+```python
+resp = descope_client.app.start(
+    app_id="my-federated-app-id", # The Federated App ID from the Descope console
+    return_url="https://my-app.com/callback", # must match a redirect URI registered on the app
+    login_hint="user@example.com", # Optional hint about the user's login identifier
+)
+# Persist resp["state"] and resp["code_verifier"] (e.g. server-side session) until the callback,
+# then redirect the browser to resp["url"]. This call makes no network request - it just builds
+# the URL (and a fresh PKCE pair) locally, since the authorize endpoint 303-redirects rather
+# than returning JSON.
+
+# On the callback (code arrives as a query param):
+jwt_response = descope_client.app.exchange_token(app_id, code, code_verifier=resp["code_verifier"])
+# jwt_response is the raw OAuth2/OIDC token shape (access_token, id_token, refresh_token, ...) -
+# not this SDK's usual sessionJwt/refreshJwt shape.
+```
+
+`start` always generates a PKCE pair as a safe default (covers apps configured as public or unspecified OAuth clients). If the app is configured as a confidential client instead, also pass `client_secret` to `exchange_token`. This whole path - `start`, a real login, and `exchange_token` - has been confirmed end-to-end against a live confidential-client test app.
+
+For a "homegrown first factor, Descope for MFA only" integration, pass `flow` to pick which Descope Flow the login page runs (overriding the app's console default) along with `login_hint` set to the user your own backend already identified - see `samples/app_oidc_mfa_sample_app.py` for a full runnable example.
+
 ### TOTP Authentication
 
 The user can authenticate using an authenticator app, such as Google Authenticator.

descope/authmethod/_app_base.py

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+# This is not part of the public API but a code helper
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import secrets
+from base64 import b64encode as base64encode
+from base64 import urlsafe_b64encode
+from typing import Dict, Optional
+from urllib.parse import urlencode
+
+from descope.exceptions import ERROR_TYPE_INVALID_ARGUMENT, AuthException
+
+
+class AppBase:
+    """Shared, I/O-free base for the Federated App auth-method classes.
+
+    Holds only static validation guards and URL/param composers — no network I/O, no
+    ``__init__``.  The two concrete subclasses add the network layer (used only by
+    ``exchange_token``):
+
+    - ``App(AppBase, AuthMethodBase)`` — sync, uses ``self._http`` (``HTTPClient``)
+    - ``AppAsync(AppBase, AsyncAuthMethodBase)`` — async, uses ``self._http`` (``HTTPClientAsync``)
+
+    A "Federated App" is configured in the Descope Console and represents a
+    homegrown/third-party application that delegates its sign-in flow to Descope, with
+    Descope acting as the IDP - a real OAuth2 authorize/token pair, confirmed live against a
+    real project's ".well-known/openid-configuration": ``/oauth2/v1/{project_id}/authorize``
+    and ``/oauth2/v1/{project_id}/token``, with ``client_id`` set to the app's dedicated OIDC
+    client ID: ``base64(f"{project_id}:{app_id}")``, padded with trailing ``#``/``##`` so the
+    encoding needs no ``=`` (verified byte-for-byte against a live console-issued
+    ``clientId``; see ``_build_oidc_client_id``).
+
+    ``start`` never calls the network: the authorize endpoint 303-redirects rather than
+    returning JSON, so this just builds that URL (and a fresh PKCE pair) locally and hands it
+    back for you to redirect the browser to.
+
+    ``flow`` picks which Descope Flow the login page runs, overriding the app's console
+    default (confirmed live: passing an explicit ``flow`` value changes the login page's own
+    ``flow`` query param accordingly). This is how to build a "homegrown first factor,
+    Descope for MFA only" integration: your own backend handles the first factor, then calls
+    ``start`` with ``flow`` set to whatever your own MFA-only flow's ID is (or leave it unset
+    if the app's console-configured default flow is already that MFA flow), and
+    ``login_hint`` set to the already-identified user - confirmed live to arrive at the login
+    page as ``oidc_login_hint``. There is no session-based shortcut available here: OIDC's
+    other step-up mechanism (an ``su`` claim carried on Descope's own short-lived "DS"
+    session cookie, forwarded via ``oidc-su-session``) requires the browser to already hold a
+    Descope-issued session from some prior Descope-native auth - it doesn't apply when the
+    first factor never touches Descope at all, which is exactly this case.
+
+    CONFIRMED LIVE, full round trip, against a real confidential-client test app
+    (project P3I9XNBUps4jHk4ybbaezDSu7mjH, app SA3I9XPZkJYkcCwN34D77fNpGL1D9): ``start``'s
+    URL 303-redirected to Descope's hosted login page with the expected ``sso_app_id``; after
+    completing that login (twice - once against the default flow, once against a
+    console-edited magic-link MFA flow) and pasting back the resulting ``code``,
+    ``exchange_token`` (with both ``code_verifier`` and ``client_secret`` supplied) returned
+    real ``access_token``/``refresh_token``/``id_token`` JWTs with `expires_in: 600`. So for a
+    confidential client, PKCE + client_secret together are accepted (the client_secret is
+    what's actually required for this client type; PKCE was extra and harmless). Passing a
+    ``client_secret`` on a public client, or omitting it on a confidential one, is not yet
+    tested. Also not yet tested: redirect_uri validation (an unregistered redirect_uri did
+    not block the initial authorize redirect in testing, which suggests it's checked later,
+    right before the post-login redirect back - not confirmed).
+
+    One thing is still defaulted rather than known per-app up front: whether a *given* app
+    requires PKCE (public client) vs a client secret (confidential) vs either (unspecified) -
+    ``app_id`` alone doesn't say which, so ``start`` always generates a PKCE pair regardless
+    (confirmed harmless above for a confidential app); pass the resulting ``code_verifier``
+    through to ``exchange_token`` either way, and add ``client_secret`` if the app turns out
+    to be confidential. The discovery doc lists both ``client_secret_basic`` and
+    ``client_secret_post`` as supported; this SDK uses the latter (secret in the POST body,
+    not a Basic auth header) - the live test above confirms that choice works.
+    """
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _validate_app_id(app_id: Optional[str]) -> None:
+        if not app_id:
+            raise AuthException(400, ERROR_TYPE_INVALID_ARGUMENT, "App ID cannot be empty")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _validate_return_url(return_url: Optional[str]) -> None:
+        if not return_url:
+            raise AuthException(
+                400,
+                ERROR_TYPE_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
+                "return_url is required (it must match a redirect URI registered on the app "
+                "in the Descope Console)",
+            )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _generate_random_token(nbytes: int = 32) -> str:
+        return secrets.token_urlsafe(nbytes)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _generate_pkce_pair() -> tuple:
+        """Returns (code_verifier, code_challenge) - RFC 7636, S256 method."""
+        code_verifier = secrets.token_urlsafe(64)[:128]
+        digest = hashlib.sha256(code_verifier.encode("ascii")).digest()
+        code_challenge = urlsafe_b64encode(digest).decode("ascii").rstrip("=")
+        return code_verifier, code_challenge
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _build_oidc_client_id(project_id: str, app_id: str) -> str:
+        """Replicates the backend's ``BuildApplicationClientID`` - verified to reproduce a
+        real console-issued ``clientId`` byte-for-byte. Standard (not URL-safe) base64,
+        padded with ``#``/``##`` before encoding so the output needs no ``=``."""
+        raw = f"{project_id}:{app_id}"
+        pad = {1: "##", 2: "#"}.get(len(raw) % 3, "")
+        return base64encode((raw + pad).encode("ascii")).decode("ascii")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _compose_oidc_authorize_url(
+        base_url: str,
+        project_id: str,
+        app_id: str,
+        return_url: str,
+        tenant: str,
+        login_hint: str,
+        scope: str,
+        state: str,
+        code_challenge: str,
+        flow: str,
+    ) -> str:
+        params: Dict[str, str] = {
+            "response_type": "code",
+            "client_id": AppBase._build_oidc_client_id(project_id, app_id),
+            "redirect_uri": return_url,
+            "scope": scope,
+            "state": state,
+            "code_challenge": code_challenge,
+            "code_challenge_method": "S256",
+        }
+        if tenant:
+            params["tenant"] = tenant
+        if login_hint:
+            params["login_hint"] = login_hint
+        if flow:
+            params["flow"] = flow
+        return f"{base_url}/oauth2/v1/{project_id}/authorize?{urlencode(params)}"
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _compose_oidc_token_body(
+        project_id: str,
+        app_id: str,
+        code: str,
+        code_verifier: str,
+        client_secret: str,
+        redirect_uri: str,
+    ) -> Dict[str, str]:
+        body: Dict[str, str] = {
+            "grant_type": "authorization_code",
+            "code": code,
+            "client_id": AppBase._build_oidc_client_id(project_id, app_id),
+        }
+        if code_verifier:
+            body["code_verifier"] = code_verifier
+        if client_secret:
+            body["client_secret"] = client_secret
+        if redirect_uri:
+            body["redirect_uri"] = redirect_uri
+        return body

descope/authmethod/app.py

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Optional
+
+import httpx
+
+from descope._authmethod_base import AuthMethodBase
+from descope.authmethod._app_base import AppBase
+from descope.exceptions import ERROR_TYPE_INVALID_ARGUMENT, ERROR_TYPE_SERVER_ERROR, AuthException
+
+
+class App(AppBase, AuthMethodBase):
+    def start(
+        self,
+        app_id: str,
+        return_url: str,
+        tenant: Optional[str] = None,
+        login_hint: Optional[str] = None,
+        scope: Optional[str] = None,
+        state: Optional[str] = None,
+        flow: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> dict:
+        """
+        Build the sign-in redirect URL for an OIDC Federated App.
+
+        This makes no network call: the authorize endpoint 303-redirects rather than
+        returning JSON, so this just builds the URL (and a fresh PKCE pair) locally. See
+        ``AppBase`` for the full explanation and the live round-trip confirmation.
+
+        Args:
+            app_id (str): The Federated App ID (as configured in the Descope Console)
+            return_url (str): Must match a redirect URI registered on the app in the console.
+            tenant (str, optional): Tenant ID or name, for apps scoped to a specific tenant
+            login_hint (str, optional): Hint about the user's login identifier
+            scope (str, optional): Defaults to "openid"
+            state (str, optional): Defaults to a generated random value (returned back to you
+                either way, so you can verify it on the callback)
+            flow (str, optional): Which Descope Flow the login page runs, overriding the
+                app's console default. Use this for a "homegrown first factor, Descope for
+                MFA only" integration: pass your own MFA-only flow's ID along with
+                ``login_hint`` set to the already-identified user - confirmed live to reach
+                the login page as ``oidc_login_hint``. Leave unset if the app's console
+                default flow is already the MFA flow you want. See ``AppBase`` for why the
+                session-cookie-based step-up shortcut doesn't apply when the first factor
+                never touches Descope.
+
+        Return value (dict): ``{'url': ..., 'state': ..., 'code_verifier': ...}`` - hold onto
+        ``state`` and ``code_verifier`` and pass them to ``exchange_token``.
+        """
+        self._validate_app_id(app_id)
+        self._validate_return_url(return_url)
+
+        code_verifier, code_challenge = self._generate_pkce_pair()
+        resolved_state = state if state else self._generate_random_token()
+        url = self._compose_oidc_authorize_url(
+            self._http.base_url,
+            self._auth.project_id,
+            app_id,
+            return_url,
+            tenant if tenant else "",
+            login_hint if login_hint else "",
+            scope if scope else "openid",
+            resolved_state,
+            code_challenge,
+            flow if flow else "",
+        )
+        return {"url": url, "state": resolved_state, "code_verifier": code_verifier}
+
+    def exchange_token(
+        self,
+        app_id: str,
+        code: str,
+        code_verifier: Optional[str] = None,
+        client_secret: Optional[str] = None,
+        redirect_uri: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> dict:
+        """
+        Exchange a Federated App authorization code for tokens.
+
+        CONFIRMED LIVE end-to-end: a real login through the URL from ``start``, followed by
+        this call with the resulting code, code_verifier, and the app's client_secret,
+        returned real access/refresh/ID tokens (see ``AppBase`` for the details). This
+        bypasses the SDK's normal HTTP layer deliberately - the token endpoint is a standard
+        OAuth2 endpoint (form-encoded body, client credentials in the body, no Descope bearer
+        header), confirmed working via ``client_secret_post`` (secret in the body, per the
+        project's discovery document).
+
+        Args:
+            app_id (str): The Federated App ID passed to ``start``
+            code (str): The authorization code from the redirect callback
+            code_verifier (str, optional): The value ``start`` returned - pass it even for a
+                confidential app (harmless extra; confirmed live alongside client_secret)
+            client_secret (str, optional): Required if the app is a confidential client
+            redirect_uri (str, optional): Must match the return_url passed to ``start``
+
+        Returns dict in the raw OAuth2/OIDC token shape (access_token, token_type,
+        refresh_token, id_token, expires_in, scope) - not this SDK's usual session shape.
+        """
+        self._validate_app_id(app_id)
+        if not code:
+            raise AuthException(400, ERROR_TYPE_INVALID_ARGUMENT, "code cannot be empty")
+
+        body = self._compose_oidc_token_body(
+            self._auth.project_id,
+            app_id,
+            code,
+            code_verifier if code_verifier else "",
+            client_secret if client_secret else "",
+            redirect_uri if redirect_uri else "",
+        )
+        response = httpx.post(
+            f"{self._http.base_url}/oauth2/v1/{self._auth.project_id}/token",
+            data=body,
+            follow_redirects=False,
+            verify=self._http.client_verify,
+            timeout=self._http.timeout_seconds,
+        )
+        if response.status_code >= 400:
+            raise AuthException(response.status_code, ERROR_TYPE_SERVER_ERROR, response.text)
+        return response.json()

descope/authmethod/app_async.py

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Optional
+
+from descope._authmethod_base import AsyncAuthMethodBase
+from descope.authmethod._app_base import AppBase
+from descope.exceptions import ERROR_TYPE_INVALID_ARGUMENT, ERROR_TYPE_SERVER_ERROR, AuthException
+
+
+class AppAsync(AppBase, AsyncAuthMethodBase):
+    """Async Federated App (OIDC only - see AppBase) auth-method. ``start`` is I/O-free but
+    stays ``async def`` for a consistent call shape; ``exchange_token`` does a real
+    coroutine-based network call."""
+
+    async def start(
+        self,
+        app_id: str,
+        return_url: str,
+        tenant: Optional[str] = None,
+        login_hint: Optional[str] = None,
+        scope: Optional[str] = None,
+        state: Optional[str] = None,
+        flow: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> dict:
+        """Build the sign-in redirect URL for an OIDC Federated App; see ``App.start`` (the
+        sync equivalent) for the full explanation."""
+        self._validate_app_id(app_id)
+        self._validate_return_url(return_url)
+
+        code_verifier, code_challenge = self._generate_pkce_pair()
+        resolved_state = state if state else self._generate_random_token()
+        url = self._compose_oidc_authorize_url(
+            self._http.base_url,
+            self._auth.project_id,
+            app_id,
+            return_url,
+            tenant if tenant else "",
+            login_hint if login_hint else "",
+            scope if scope else "openid",
+            resolved_state,
+            code_challenge,
+            flow if flow else "",
+        )
+        return {"url": url, "state": resolved_state, "code_verifier": code_verifier}
+
+    async def exchange_token(
+        self,
+        app_id: str,
+        code: str,
+        code_verifier: Optional[str] = None,
+        client_secret: Optional[str] = None,
+        redirect_uri: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> dict:
+        """Exchange a Federated App authorization code for tokens; see
+        ``App.exchange_token`` (the sync equivalent) for the full explanation - confirmed
+        with a live end-to-end test."""
+        self._validate_app_id(app_id)
+        if not code:
+            raise AuthException(400, ERROR_TYPE_INVALID_ARGUMENT, "code cannot be empty")
+
+        body = self._compose_oidc_token_body(
+            self._auth.project_id,
+            app_id,
+            code,
+            code_verifier if code_verifier else "",
+            client_secret if client_secret else "",
+            redirect_uri if redirect_uri else "",
+        )
+        response = await self._http._async_client.post(
+            f"{self._http.base_url}/oauth2/v1/{self._auth.project_id}/token",
+            data=body,
+            follow_redirects=False,
+        )
+        if response.status_code >= 400:
+            raise AuthException(response.status_code, ERROR_TYPE_SERVER_ERROR, response.text)
+        return response.json()

descope/common.py

@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ class EndpointsV1:
     auth_sso_start_path = "/v1/auth/sso/authorize"
     sso_exchange_token_path = "/v1/auth/sso/exchange"
 
+    # app (federated apps - oidc only; see AppBase for why saml/wsfed aren't supported)
+
     # totp
     sign_up_auth_totp_path = "/v1/auth/totp/signup"
     verify_totp_path = "/v1/auth/totp/verify"