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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ the intended product. If the clause does not directly match, continue normal Aud
## Missing-guardrail fast path — completed deliverable

When the entry source clearly matches a catalog use case and no matching guardrail is wired (no middleware, no
`@guardrail`), use this bounded sequence:
`@guardrail`), use this bounded sequence. If any guardrail is already wired, audit each one first (conclusive audit
fast path or Audit Mode); this fast path then only adds recommendations to that report.

1. run `uip codedagent review`; retain its deterministic findings and `Data.Grade`;
2. read the entry `.py` per [Read the agent first](#read-the-agent-first);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -360,3 +361,5 @@ Merge findings into the Step 5 Critical / Warning / Info findings tables (agent-
named.
8. **Review only** — emit findings; never write guardrails, edit the entry `.py`, or run mutating `uip codedagent`
commands.
9. **Audit before recommending** — when any guardrail is wired, audit each one before emitting any
`CODED_GUARDRAIL_RECOMMENDED`; every wired guardrail is named in the report.
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Decisions are **live-catalog driven**. Use catalog `when_to_use`, `use_cases`, `

## Conclusive existing-guardrail fast path — completed report checkpoint

When a format-valid guardrail and its selected source conclusively match a catalog `when_not_to_use` clause:
When a format-valid guardrail and its selected source conclusively match a catalog `when_not_to_use` clause, run this sequence **before** the missing-guardrail fast path, Recommend Mode, or general manual review:

1. Run `uip agent review` and retain deterministic findings and `Data.Grade`.
2. Read the guardrail's exact source path, `id`, `name`, `validatorType`, action, scopes, and `matchNames`, plus only its selected source or resource.
Expand All @@ -28,7 +28,9 @@ Require a direct source-to-catalog contradiction, not a plausible concern. For e

## Missing-guardrail fast path — completed deliverable

When the source clearly matches a missing-guardrail use case and `guardrails[]` is absent or lacks the matching validator:
When the source clearly matches a missing-guardrail use case and `guardrails[]` is **absent or empty**:

> If `guardrails[]` has any entry, this fast path does not apply. Audit every entry first (existing-guardrail fast path or Audit Mode), then add `LC_GUARDRAIL_RECOMMENDED` findings to the same report.

1. Run `uip agent review` and retain deterministic findings and `Data.Grade`.
2. Read the system prompt, schema property names, tool/resource names, and existing `guardrails[]` from the target agent source.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -85,6 +87,8 @@ Unavailable means the **fetch itself failed**: the output contains `"Code": "Gua

For each `agent.json` `guardrails[]` entry not flagged format-invalid by the CLI, read `validator`, `selector.scopes`, and action `$actionType`, then run both checks.

**Coverage:** every `guardrails[]` entry appears in the report, either as an `LC_GUARDRAIL_ACTION_INEFFECTIVE` / `LC_GUARDRAIL_MISAPPLIED` finding or as an "audited, no defect" line naming its `name`/`id`, scope, action, and the catalog `WhenNotToUse` clause checked. Silence about a configured guardrail is a defect.

A BYO-backed entry with tenant `Status: "Disabled"` is a configuration switch, not a format problem. For a guardrail targeting that configuration through `byoValidatorName`, treat it like an `Unauthorised` validator: unable to protect, and report that condition.

### Actionability Check → `LC_GUARDRAIL_ACTION_INEFFECTIVE`
Expand All @@ -101,7 +105,7 @@ Relevant catalog-driven cases include:

Also emit when `detectionScope` is `"Files"` or `"Both"` on an agent with no `job-attachment` field and no file tool (`properties.toolType` `analyze-attachments` / `create-file`) — the guardrail has nothing to evaluate. Leave schema validity of `detectionScope` (unknown parameter, bad value) to the CLI format pass.

Read system prompt, `inputSchema`, `outputSchema`, and tool resources to establish real context. Read catalog `when_not_to_use` / `NOT_recommended_for`. Emit when the agent matches a disqualifying condition, such as a generate-only agent with no user input carrying a PII guardrail when PII output is the intended product. Cite the matched catalog clause.
Read system prompt, `inputSchema`, `outputSchema`, and tool resources to establish real context. Read catalog `when_not_to_use` / `NOT_recommended_for`. Emit when the agent matches a disqualifying condition, for example `pii_detection` at `Llm` scope on a generate-only agent whose LLM never receives real PII, including when it takes a non-PII user input such as a topic or theme. Cite the matched catalog clause.

## Recommend Mode — missing guardrails (Info recommendations)

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -156,3 +160,4 @@ Merge findings into the Step 5 Critical / Warning / Info findings tables (agent-
5. **Never silently downgrade block → log:** a security-critical guardrail at `log` is `LC_GUARDRAIL_ACTION_INEFFECTIVE`, unless the catalog/agent shows a stated reason.
6. Do not name `harmful_content` / `intellectual_property` / `user_prompt_attacks` unless already present; phrase generically. `pii_detection` / `prompt_injection` may be named.
7. **Review only:** emit findings; never write guardrails, fix `agent.json`, or run `uip agent validate`.
8. **Audit before recommending:** when `guardrails[]` is non-empty, audit every entry before emitting any `LC_GUARDRAIL_RECOMMENDED`; every configured guardrail is named in the report.
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