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Chainguard Supply-Chain Security Collaboration Angle

Status: draft — collaboration proposal for maintainer review. Issue that tracks this work: #1339 (collaboration with Chainguard on the supply chain). Target: Chainguard Relations for Open Source & Supply Chain Security / Community Discussions. Prepared: 2026-08-29.


Executive Summary

Software supply-chain integrity is central to the design of modern immutable operating systems. Chainguard is a recognized leader in security for the software supply chain. Its work includes minimal base images for containers with zero CVEs (Wolfi / Chainguard Images) and keyless cryptography for signatures (Sigstore).

TunaOS builds container-native, bootable desktop operating systems using bootc. We already incorporate Chainguard tooling and base containers—notably cgr.dev/chainguard/wolfi-base—across our build pipeline and SBOM extraction workflows.

This document outlines the shared technical alignment, existing usage, and collaborative angles between TunaOS and Chainguard for container-native host security.


Technical Alignment & Existing Touchpoints

1. Hardened Builder Images (wolfi-base)

  • TunaOS uses cgr.dev/chainguard/wolfi-base as the minimal, hardened base image for auxiliary build tools, SBOM generation scripts, and CI validation containers.
  • Renovate automation strictly pins the digests of Wolfi base images, and refreshes them continuously. This keeps the builder environments at zero CVEs.

2. Sigstore & Keyless Verification Architecture

  • TunaOS signs all published container images on GHCR and native repository artifacts using Sigstore/cosign keyless workflows.
  • TunaOS anchors verification to the public transparency log of Rekor. This removes static private keys with a long life, and reduces the risks of credential exposure.

3. Comprehensive SBOM Generation & Provenance

  • TunaOS generates SBOMs in machine-readable SPDX format for published image layers and packages.
  • TunaOS attaches attestations to OCI artifacts directly. These attestations align with the supply-chain standards of SLSA Level 3.

Proposed Collaboration Vectors

Vector A: Minimal & Hardened Build Stage Optimization

  • Initiative: Evaluate more use of Chainguard minimal images in intermediate stages for packages and in Tacklebox pipelines for ISO creation.
  • Benefit: Less surface area for CVEs in the toolchain that generates the desktop OS. This applies from extraction of source packages to publication of the ISO.

Vector B: Joint Case Study / Blog Post on Host OS Supply Chains

  • Topic: Security for the Desktop from Base Container to Bare Metal with Wolfi, Sigstore, and bootc.
  • Content: A deep dive into enterprise distributions of desktop Linux. It shows how they can remove the drift of vulnerabilities at package level, and verify cryptographic provenance at boot time.

Vector C: Supply Chain Attestation Standards for bootc

  • Initiative: Work together to establish open best practices for in-toto / cosign attestations. These attestations go into bootc bootable host containers, and verification happens during the boot stages for kernel and initramfs.

Outreach Pitch Template

Subject: Collaboration on secure bootable desktop OS supply chains (TunaOS & Chainguard)

Hi Chainguard Team,

We are the maintainers of TunaOS (https://github.com/tuna-os/tunaOS), an open-source, container-native desktop operating system built on bootc and Enterprise Linux bases.

In our build and release pipeline, we rely on Chainguard's wolfi-base images and Sigstore keyless signing to enforce strict software supply-chain integrity and zero-CVE build stages.

We would love to explore a joint collaboration or technical case study highlighting how Chainguard's minimal base image philosophy and Sigstore provenance extend to bootable, container-native host systems.

Key points of interest:

  1. Hardening immutable OS builder pipelines with Wolfi images.
  2. End-to-end provenance verification from OCI container registries down to bare-metal bootc systems.

Please let us know if you'd be open to a brief chat or async discussion on GitHub.

Best regards, The TunaOS Team


Outreach Honesty & Protocol Note

  • Cold Outreach Discipline: Issue #1339 and the corrections to the commit history record this point. Prior pre-fork commits from external contributors are bluefin-lts legacy history. They do not constitute an existing partnership. TunaOS maintainers make this proposal as cold outreach, and they do it transparently.
  • Maintainer Approval Required: A maintainer must give explicit approval before anyone sends this collaboration pitch to Chainguard channels.

Action Checklist

  • Maintainer review and sign-off on collaboration brief
  • Review builder stages for more chances to adopt Wolfi / Chainguard images
  • Start outreach via public GitHub Discussions / community channels
  • Track contact progress in ADOPTION-OUTREACH-STATUS.md