diff --git a/__tests__/components/HTMLBlock.test.tsx b/__tests__/components/HTMLBlock.test.tsx
index 71e1a9625..15c87e71a 100644
--- a/__tests__/components/HTMLBlock.test.tsx
+++ b/__tests__/components/HTMLBlock.test.tsx
@@ -55,9 +55,7 @@ describe('HTML Block', () => {
     expect(view.indexOf('<h1>')).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
   });
 
-  // TODO: Skipped about the mdxish engine fails this test since it wraps the <pre> in a <p> tag
-  // Rendering looks correct, so skip this for now until we decide if we want to fix this or not
-  it.skip.each(renderingEngines)('%s: renders the html in a `<pre>` tag if safeMode={true}', (_label, renderContent) => {
+  it.each(renderingEngines)('%s: renders the html in a `<pre>` tag if safeMode={true}', (_label, renderContent) => {
     const md = '<HTMLBlock safeMode={true}>{`<button onload="alert(\'gotcha!\')"/>`}</HTMLBlock>';
     const Component = renderContent(md);
     expect(renderToStaticMarkup(<Component />)).toBe(
diff --git a/__tests__/lib/compile-sanitize.test.tsx b/__tests__/lib/compile-sanitize.test.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a68fcd2da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/__tests__/lib/compile-sanitize.test.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+import { render } from '@testing-library/react';
+import React from 'react';
+
+import { execute } from '../helpers';
+
+// `md` format sanitizes via rehype-sanitize's allow-list (covered in run.test.tsx).
+// Default MDX keeps raw HTML as JSX nodes that allow-list never sees, so these assert
+// the deny-list stripper removes the known script-execution vectors on that path.
+describe('MDX (compile) sanitization', () => {
+  it('strips script-execution vectors in default MDX format', () => {
+    const md = [
+      '# Docs',
+      '',
+      '<script>window.__xss = 1</script>',
+      '',
+      '<a href="javascript:alert(1)">link</a>',
+      '',
+      '<a href="vbscript:msgbox(1)">link</a>',
+      '',
+      '<a href="data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>">link</a>',
+      '',
+      '<img src="x" onerror="window.__xss = 1" />',
+      '',
+      '<iframe src="javascript:alert(1)"></iframe>',
+    ].join('\n');
+
+    const Component = execute(md, {}, {}); // no format => MDX
+    const { container } = render(<Component />);
+
+    expect(container.querySelector('script')).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+    expect(container.querySelector('iframe')).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+
+    // The link text still renders, but no anchor carries a script-executing href.
+    const dangerousScheme = /^\s*(?:javascript|vbscript|data):/i;
+    const hrefs = [...container.querySelectorAll('a')].map(a => a.getAttribute('href'));
+    expect(hrefs.some(href => href !== null && dangerousScheme.test(href))).toBe(false);
+    expect(container.textContent).toContain('link');
+
+    // Image still renders, but the onerror handler is gone.
+    const image = container.querySelector('img');
+    expect(image?.getAttribute('onerror')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('strips the MathML namespace-confusion payload in default MDX format', () => {
+    const md = '# Docs\n\n<math><mtext><script>window.__xss = 1</script></mtext></math>';
+
+    const Component = execute(md, {}, {});
+    const { container } = render(<Component />);
+
+    expect(container.querySelector('script')).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+    expect(container.querySelector('math')).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+    expect(container.querySelector('h1')).toBeInTheDocument();
+  });
+});
diff --git a/__tests__/lib/mdxish/sanitize-raw-html.test.ts b/__tests__/lib/mdxish/sanitize-raw-html.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8220661bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/__tests__/lib/mdxish/sanitize-raw-html.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+import type { RMDXModule } from '../../../types';
+
+import { visit } from 'unist-util-visit';
+
+import { mdxish } from '../../../lib';
+import { findAllElementsByTagName, findElementByTagName } from '../../helpers';
+
+/** Collects every property key present on any element in the tree. */
+function allPropertyKeys(tree: ReturnType<typeof mdxish>): string[] {
+  const keys = new Set<string>();
+  visit(tree, 'element', node => {
+    Object.keys(node.properties ?? {}).forEach(key => keys.add(key));
+  });
+  return [...keys];
+}
+
+describe('mdxish raw HTML sanitization', () => {
+  describe('script execution vectors', () => {
+    it('strips the MathML namespace-confusion payload from the report', () => {
+      const tree = mdxish('# Docs\n\n<math><mtext><script>window.__xssfired=1</script></mtext></math>\n');
+
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'script')).toBeNull();
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'math')).toBeNull();
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'mtext')).toBeNull();
+      // The heading and surrounding structure survive.
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'h1')).not.toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('strips scripts containing String.fromCharCode payload', () => {
+      const payload =
+        '<math><mtext><script>fetch(String.fromCharCode(47,97,112,105)).then(function(r){return r.text()})</script></mtext></math>';
+      const tree = mdxish(`# Docs\n\n${payload}\n`);
+
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'script')).toBeNull();
+      expect(JSON.stringify(tree)).not.toContain('fromCharCode');
+    });
+
+    it('strips a bare top-level <script>', () => {
+      const tree = mdxish('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'script')).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('strips SVG foreign content carrying a script', () => {
+      const tree = mdxish('<svg><foreignObject><script>alert(1)</script></foreignObject></svg>');
+
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'svg')).toBeNull();
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'script')).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('strips embedders (iframe/object)', () => {
+      const tree = mdxish('<iframe src="javascript:alert(1)"></iframe>\n\n<object data="x"></object>');
+
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'iframe')).toBeNull();
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'object')).toBeNull();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('attribute vectors', () => {
+    it('removes event-handler attributes but keeps the element', () => {
+      const tree = mdxish('<img src="x.png" onerror="alert(1)" alt="ok">');
+
+      const img = findElementByTagName(tree, 'img');
+      expect(img).not.toBeNull();
+      expect(allPropertyKeys(tree)).not.toContain('onError');
+      expect(img?.properties?.src).toBe('x.png');
+    });
+
+    it('removes javascript: hrefs but keeps the anchor text', () => {
+      const tree = mdxish('<a href="javascript:alert(1)">click me</a>');
+
+      const anchor = findElementByTagName(tree, 'a');
+      expect(anchor).not.toBeNull();
+      expect(anchor?.properties?.href).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(JSON.stringify(tree)).toContain('click me');
+    });
+
+    it('ignores whitespace/control-char obfuscated javascript: URLs', () => {
+      const tree = mdxish('<a href="java\tscript:alert(1)">x</a>');
+
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'a')?.properties?.href).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('safe content is preserved', () => {
+    it('keeps benign formatting, links, and images', () => {
+      const tree = mdxish(
+        '<div class="note"><strong>Bold</strong> and <a href="https://example.com">link</a></div>\n\n<img src="https://example.com/a.png" alt="ok">',
+      );
+
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'strong')).not.toBeNull();
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'a')?.properties?.href).toBe('https://example.com');
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'img')?.properties?.src).toBe('https://example.com/a.png');
+    });
+
+    it('keeps relative and mailto links', () => {
+      const tree = mdxish('<a href="/docs/start">a</a> <a href="mailto:x@y.com">b</a>');
+
+      const hrefs = findAllElementsByTagName(tree, 'a').map(node => node.properties?.href);
+      expect(hrefs).toStrictEqual(['/docs/start', 'mailto:x@y.com']);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('custom components', () => {
+    const testComponents: Record<string, RMDXModule> = {
+      TestComponent: {} as RMDXModule
+    }
+      
+    it('keeps event-handler-named props but strips dangerous URL props on PascalCase components', () => {
+      const tree = mdxish('<TestComponent onClick="fn" href="javascript:alert(1)" />', {
+        components: testComponents,
+      });
+
+      const component = findElementByTagName(tree, 'TestComponent');
+      // `on*` props are React props on a component, not DOM handlers, so they survive...
+      expect(component?.properties?.onClick).toBe('fn');
+      // ...but a `javascript:` URL prop is stripped: a component may forward it to a host element.
+      expect(component?.properties?.href).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('keeps safe URL props on PascalCase components', () => {
+      const tree = mdxish('<TestComponent href="https://example.com" />', {
+        components: testComponents,
+      });
+
+      const component = findElementByTagName(tree, 'TestComponent');
+      expect(component?.properties?.href).toBe('https://example.com');
+    });
+
+    it('still sanitizes raw HTML nested inside a component', () => {
+      const tree = mdxish('<TestComponent>\n\n<img src="x" onerror="alert(1)">\n\n</TestComponent>', {
+        components: testComponents,
+      });
+
+      expect(allPropertyKeys(tree)).not.toContain('onError');
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'img')).not.toBeNull();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('integration with other nodes', () => {
+    it('sanitizes raw HTML embedded inside a table cell', () => {
+      const tree = mdxish('| A | B |\n| --- | --- |\n| <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> | ok |');
+
+      expect(allPropertyKeys(tree)).not.toContain('onError');
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'script')).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('sanitizes raw HTML nested inside a callout', () => {
+      const tree = mdxish('> 📘 Title\n>\n> <script>alert(1)</script> body text');
+
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'script')).toBeNull();
+      expect(JSON.stringify(tree)).toContain('body text');
+    });
+
+    it('sanitizes raw HTML nested inside a JSX table cell', () => {
+      const tree = mdxish(`
+<Table>
+  <tbody>
+    <tr>
+      <td>
+        <script>alert(1)</script>
+      </td>
+    </tr>
+  </tbody>
+</Table>
+        `);
+
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'script')).toBeNull();
+      expect(findElementByTagName(tree, 'table')).not.toBeNull();
+    });
+  });
+});
diff --git a/__tests__/processor/plugin/dangerous-html.test.ts b/__tests__/processor/plugin/dangerous-html.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6453ee297
--- /dev/null
+++ b/__tests__/processor/plugin/dangerous-html.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+/* eslint-disable no-script-url -- the `javascript:`/`vbscript:` URLs are intentional XSS fixtures */
+import type { Element, Root } from 'hast';
+import type { MdxJsxFlowElementHast } from 'mdast-util-mdx-jsx';
+
+import { stripDangerousHtml } from '../../../processor/plugin/dangerous-html';
+
+const root = (...children: Root['children']): Root => ({ type: 'root', children });
+
+const el = (tagName: string, properties: Element['properties'] = {}, children: Element['children'] = []): Element => ({
+  type: 'element',
+  tagName,
+  properties,
+  children,
+});
+
+const jsx = (name: string | null, attributes: MdxJsxFlowElementHast['attributes'] = []): MdxJsxFlowElementHast => ({
+  type: 'mdxJsxFlowElement',
+  name,
+  attributes,
+  children: [],
+});
+
+describe('stripDangerousHtml', () => {
+  describe('dangerous tag removal', () => {
+    it.each([
+      'script',
+      'noscript',
+      'template',
+      'iframe',
+      'frame',
+      'frameset',
+      'object',
+      'applet',
+      'base',
+      'link',
+      'meta',
+      'svg',
+      'math',
+    ])('removes <%s> and its subtree', tagName => {
+      const tree = root(el('p'), el(tagName, {}, [el('span')]), el('div'));
+
+      stripDangerousHtml(tree);
+
+      const tags = tree.children.map(child => (child.type === 'element' ? child.tagName : child.type));
+      expect(tags).toStrictEqual(['p', 'div']);
+    });
+
+    // Lowercase-leading names are host elements (uppercase-leading ones are custom
+    // components), so the deny-set lookup lowercases to also catch e.g. `iFrame`.
+    it('matches lowercase-leading dangerous tags case-insensitively', () => {
+      const tree = root(el('iFrame'));
+
+      stripDangerousHtml(tree);
+
+      expect(tree.children).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    it('removes consecutive dangerous siblings', () => {
+      const tree = root(el('script'), el('iframe'), el('p'));
+
+      stripDangerousHtml(tree);
+
+      expect(tree.children).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect((tree.children[0] as Element).tagName).toBe('p');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('host element attribute cleaning', () => {
+    it('drops event-handler attributes', () => {
+      const node = el('img', { src: 'x', onError: 'steal()', onClick: 'go()' });
+      stripDangerousHtml(root(node));
+
+      expect(node.properties).toStrictEqual({ src: 'x' });
+    });
+
+    it('drops javascript: and vbscript: URLs on url-valued attributes', () => {
+      const node = el('a', { href: 'javascript:alert(1)' });
+      const node2 = el('a', { href: 'vbscript:msgbox(1)' });
+      stripDangerousHtml(root(node, node2));
+
+      expect(node.properties).toStrictEqual({});
+      expect(node2.properties).toStrictEqual({});
+    });
+
+    it('keeps safe URLs', () => {
+      const node = el('a', { href: 'https://example.com/javascript:not-a-scheme' });
+      stripDangerousHtml(root(node));
+
+      expect(node.properties?.href).toBe('https://example.com/javascript:not-a-scheme');
+    });
+
+    it('drops dangerous data: URLs but keeps benign ones', () => {
+      const danger = el('a', { href: 'data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>' });
+      const safe = el('img', { src: '' });
+      stripDangerousHtml(root(danger, safe));
+
+      expect(danger.properties).toStrictEqual({});
+      expect(safe.properties?.src).toBe('');
+    });
+
+    it('ignores control characters when resolving the scheme', () => {
+      const node = el('a', { href: 'java\tscript:alert(1)' });
+      stripDangerousHtml(root(node));
+
+      expect(node.properties).toStrictEqual({});
+    });
+
+    it('keeps a normal srcset (treated as a single URL, no javascript: scheme)', () => {
+      const node = el('img', { srcSet: 'a.png 1x, b.png 2x' });
+      stripDangerousHtml(root(node));
+
+      expect(node.properties?.srcSet).toBe('a.png 1x, b.png 2x');
+    });
+
+    it('normalizes attribute names so xlink:href / formaction are checked', () => {
+      const node = el('a', { xLinkHref: 'javascript:alert(1)', formAction: 'javascript:alert(1)' });
+      stripDangerousHtml(root(node));
+
+      expect(node.properties).toStrictEqual({});
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('MDX JSX nodes', () => {
+    it('drops event-handler and javascript: attributes on host JSX elements', () => {
+      const node = jsx('a', [
+        { type: 'mdxJsxAttribute', name: 'onClick', value: 'go()' },
+        { type: 'mdxJsxAttribute', name: 'href', value: 'javascript:alert(1)' },
+        { type: 'mdxJsxAttribute', name: 'id', value: 'keep' },
+      ]);
+      stripDangerousHtml(root(node));
+
+      expect(node.attributes).toStrictEqual([{ type: 'mdxJsxAttribute', name: 'id', value: 'keep' }]);
+    });
+
+    it('drops expression-valued URL attributes on host JSX elements', () => {
+      // `href={'javascript:alert(1)'}` / `formAction={...}` — a non-string value could still
+      // resolve to a dangerous scheme at render time, so it can't be trusted like a literal.
+      const node = jsx('a', [
+        { type: 'mdxJsxAttribute', name: 'href', value: { type: 'mdxJsxAttributeValueExpression', value: "'javascript:alert(1)'", data: {} } },
+        { type: 'mdxJsxAttribute', name: 'formAction', value: { type: 'mdxJsxAttributeValueExpression', value: 'dynamicUrl', data: {} } },
+        { type: 'mdxJsxAttribute', name: 'id', value: 'keep' },
+      ]);
+      stripDangerousHtml(root(node));
+
+      expect(node.attributes).toStrictEqual([{ type: 'mdxJsxAttribute', name: 'id', value: 'keep' }]);
+    });
+
+    it('keeps spread expression attributes untouched', () => {
+      const spread = { type: 'mdxJsxExpressionAttribute', value: '...{ onClick: handler }' } as const;
+      const node = jsx('div', [spread]);
+      stripDangerousHtml(root(node));
+
+      expect(node.attributes).toStrictEqual([spread]);
+    });
+
+    it('preserves PascalCase components and their on* props, but strips URL props and cleans children', () => {
+      const child = el('img', { onError: 'steal()' });
+      const component = jsx('Callout', [
+        { type: 'mdxJsxAttribute', name: 'onClick', value: 'props-not-a-handler' },
+        { type: 'mdxJsxAttribute', name: 'href', value: 'javascript:alert(1)' },
+      ]);
+      component.children = [child];
+      stripDangerousHtml(root(component));
+
+      // The `on*` prop survives (React prop, not a DOM handler), but the dangerous URL prop
+      // is stripped since a component may forward it to a host element...
+      expect(component.attributes).toStrictEqual([
+        { type: 'mdxJsxAttribute', name: 'onClick', value: 'props-not-a-handler' },
+      ]);
+      // ...and the nested raw <img> handler is stripped.
+      expect(child.properties).toStrictEqual({});
+    });
+  });
+});
diff --git a/lib/compile.ts b/lib/compile.ts
index 1ae9c7fdb..5374f2b9a 100644
--- a/lib/compile.ts
+++ b/lib/compile.ts
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import remarkFrontmatter from 'remark-frontmatter';
 import remarkGfm from 'remark-gfm';
 
 import MdxSyntaxError from '../errors/mdx-syntax-error';
+import rehypeStripDangerousHtml from '../processor/plugin/dangerous-html';
 import { rehypeToc } from '../processor/plugin/toc';
 import {
   defaultTransforms,
@@ -39,7 +40,18 @@ const sanitizeSchema = deepmerge(defaultSchema, {
 
 const compile = (
   text: string,
-  { components = {}, missingComponents, copyButtons, useTailwind, hardBreaks, ...opts }: CompileOpts = {},
+  {
+    components = {},
+    missingComponents,
+    copyButtons,
+    useTailwind,
+    hardBreaks,
+    // Pulled out of `...opts` so the sanitizer below is always appended last: a caller's
+    // `rehypePlugins`/`remarkPlugins` must not replace the pipeline (and drop the stripper).
+    remarkPlugins: userRemarkPlugins = [],
+    rehypePlugins: userRehypePlugins = [],
+    ...opts
+  }: CompileOpts = {},
 ) => {
   // Destructure at runtime to avoid circular dependency issues
   const { codeTabsTransformer, ...transforms } = defaultTransforms;
@@ -54,14 +66,16 @@ const compile = (
       handleMissingComponents,
       { components, missingComponents: ['ignore', 'throw'].includes(missingComponents) ? missingComponents : 'ignore' },
     ],
-    [validateMCPIntro],
+    [validateMCPIntro]
   ];
 
   if (useTailwind) {
     remarkPlugins.push([tailwindTransformer, { components }]);
   }
 
-  const rehypePlugins: PluggableList = [...defaultRehypePlugins, [rehypeToc, { components }]];
+  remarkPlugins.push(...userRemarkPlugins);
+
+  const rehypePlugins: PluggableList = [...defaultRehypePlugins, [rehypeToc, { components }], ...userRehypePlugins];
 
   if (opts.format === 'md') {
     /**
@@ -79,6 +93,11 @@ const compile = (
       },
     ]);
     rehypePlugins.push([rehypeSanitize, sanitizeSchema]);
+  } else {
+    // MDX keeps raw HTML as JSX nodes the `rehypeSanitize` allow-list never sees, and
+    // custom components must survive an allow-list anyway, so fall back to a deny-list.
+    // Narrower guarantee than the `md` path — see `dangerous-html.ts`.
+    rehypePlugins.push(rehypeStripDangerousHtml);
   }
 
   try {
diff --git a/lib/mdxish.ts b/lib/mdxish.ts
index b4054b62c..d1ea704c9 100644
--- a/lib/mdxish.ts
+++ b/lib/mdxish.ts
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import { unified } from 'unified';
 import { VFile } from 'vfile';
 
 import { mdxishCompilers } from '../processor/compile';
+import rehypeStripDangerousHtml from '../processor/plugin/dangerous-html';
 import { rehypeFlattenTableCellParagraphs } from '../processor/plugin/flatten-table-cell-paragraphs';
 import { rehypeMdxishComponents } from '../processor/plugin/mdxish-components';
 import { mdxComponentHandlers } from '../processor/plugin/mdxish-handlers';
@@ -286,6 +287,7 @@ export function mdxish(mdContent: string, opts: MdxishOpts = {}): Root {
     .use(restoreBooleanProperties)
     .use(safeMode ? undefined : resolveDeferredAttributeExpressionProps) // Evaluate deferred attribute expressions on mdx-jsx nodes (now past rehypeRaw's clone)
     .use(normalizeMdxJsxNodes) // Rewrite `mdx-jsx` back to standard `element` nodes for downstream plugins
+    .use(rehypeStripDangerousHtml) // Strip script/foreign-content/event-handler XSS vectors from raw HTML
     .use(rehypeFlattenTableCellParagraphs) // Remove <p> wrappers inside table cells to prevent margin issues
     .use(mdxishMermaidTransformer) // Add mermaid-render className to pre wrappers
     .use(generateSlugForHeadings)
diff --git a/processor/plugin/dangerous-html.ts b/processor/plugin/dangerous-html.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8086e4540
--- /dev/null
+++ b/processor/plugin/dangerous-html.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+import type { Root, Element } from 'hast';
+import type { MdxJsxAttribute } from 'mdast-util-mdx-jsx';
+import type { Node, Parent } from 'unist';
+
+import { SKIP, visit } from 'unist-util-visit';
+
+// A deny-list, deliberately weaker than the `md` pipeline's `rehype-sanitize`
+// allow-list: those pipelines preserve arbitrary custom components, which an
+// allow-list can't express. Anything not enumerated below passes through, so
+// CSS exfiltration via `style` and similar lower-severity vectors are out of scope.
+
+/**
+ * Elements removed wholesale (subtree included) because they execute script,
+ * load remote resources, or open a foreign-content (MathML/SVG) parsing context
+ * that lets `<script>` survive namespace-confusion bypasses.
+ */
+const DANGEROUS_TAG_NAMES = new Set([
+  'script',
+  'noscript',
+  'template',
+  'iframe',
+  'frame',
+  'frameset',
+  'object',
+  'applet',
+  'base',
+  'link',
+  'meta',
+  'svg',
+  'math',
+]);
+
+/**
+ * URL-valued attributes that can carry a `javascript:` payload. Compared after
+ * normalizing the attribute name (lowercased, non-letters stripped) so both hast
+ * properties (`xLinkHref`, `formAction`) and raw JSX attributes (`xlink:href`,
+ * `formaction`) match the same entry.
+ */
+const URL_ATTRIBUTES = new Set([
+  'href',
+  'src',
+  'srcset',
+  'xlinkhref',
+  'action',
+  'formaction',
+  'poster',
+  'background',
+  'cite',
+  'data',
+  'ping',
+  'longdesc',
+  'manifest',
+]);
+
+const EVENT_HANDLER_ATTRIBUTE = /^on/i;
+
+// Control characters and spaces HTML strips before resolving a URL scheme; keeping
+// them would let `java\tscript:` slip past the protocol check below.
+// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+const IGNORED_URL_CHARS = /[\u0000-\u0020]/g;
+
+const normalizeAttributeName = (name: string): string => name.toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z]/g, '');
+
+const isEventHandlerAttribute = (name: string): boolean => EVENT_HANDLER_ATTRIBUTE.test(name);
+
+const isUrlAttribute = (name: string): boolean => URL_ATTRIBUTES.has(normalizeAttributeName(name));
+
+// PascalCase names are custom React components (e.g. `<Callout>`), not host
+// elements; their `on*`/url-like values are component props, not DOM handlers.
+const isComponentName = (name: string): boolean => /^[A-Z]/.test(name);
+
+/**
+ * True for URLs that execute on navigation/load. Only a leading scheme matters:
+ * a colon that appears after a `/`, `?`, or `#` is part of a relative path, not a scheme.
+ * 
+ * Re-derives scheme parsing the `md` allow-list gets from rehype-sanitize, since the
+ * deny-list path has no schema. Treats the value as one URL, so it can't vet each entry
+ * of a comma-delimited `srcset` — fine only because `srcset` can't run a `javascript:` scheme.
+ */
+const isDangerousUrl = (value: unknown): boolean => {
+  if (typeof value !== 'string') return false;
+
+  const normalized = value.replace(IGNORED_URL_CHARS, '').toLowerCase();
+  const colonIndex = normalized.indexOf(':');
+  if (colonIndex === -1) return false;
+
+  const pathDelimiterIndex = normalized.search(/[/?#]/);
+  if (pathDelimiterIndex !== -1 && pathDelimiterIndex < colonIndex) return false;
+
+  const scheme = normalized.slice(0, colonIndex);
+  if (scheme === 'javascript' || scheme === 'vbscript') return true;
+
+  // `data:` is only dangerous when it can render markup/script (e.g. data:text/html).
+  return scheme === 'data' && /^[^,]*(?:html|xml|script|svg)/.test(normalized.slice(colonIndex + 1));
+};
+
+// One tree can mix hast `element` nodes (`tagName`/`properties`) with MDX JSX nodes
+// (`name`/`attributes`), since the `compile` pipeline never round-trips JSX through
+// parse5. A host element is exactly one shape, so guards narrow before touching attrs.
+interface MdxJsxElementNode extends Node {
+  attributes?: MdxJsxAttribute[];
+  name?: string | null;
+  type: 'mdxJsxFlowElement' | 'mdxJsxTextElement';
+}
+
+const isHastElement = (node: Node): node is Element => node.type === 'element';
+const isMdxJsxElement = (node: Node): node is MdxJsxElementNode =>
+  node.type === 'mdxJsxFlowElement' || node.type === 'mdxJsxTextElement';
+
+/** The element/component name for either node shape, or null for text/root/fragments. */
+const elementName = (node: Node): string | null => {
+  if (isHastElement(node)) return node.tagName;
+  if (isMdxJsxElement(node)) return node.name ?? null;
+  return null;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Removes `javascript:`-bearing URL attributes from either node shape, in place.
+ * With `stripEventHandlers`, also drops `on*` attributes — passed for host elements
+ * (where `on*` are DOM handlers) but not custom components (where they're React props).
+ *
+ * A URL attribute survives only as a safe string literal: a non-string value (an MDX
+ * `href={expr}` expression node) could still resolve to `javascript:` at render time,
+ * so it's dropped rather than trusted.
+ */
+const cleanElement = (node: Node, stripEventHandlers: boolean): void => {
+  if (isHastElement(node) && node.properties) {
+    const { properties } = node;
+    Object.keys(properties).forEach(key => {
+      if (
+        (stripEventHandlers && isEventHandlerAttribute(key)) ||
+        (isUrlAttribute(key) && isDangerousUrl(properties[key]))
+      ) {
+        delete properties[key];
+      }
+    });
+  }
+
+  if (isMdxJsxElement(node) && node.attributes) {
+    node.attributes = node.attributes.filter(attr => {
+      if (attr.type !== 'mdxJsxAttribute' || typeof attr.name !== 'string') return true; // keep `{...spread}`
+      if (stripEventHandlers && isEventHandlerAttribute(attr.name)) return false;
+      if (isUrlAttribute(attr.name)) return typeof attr.value === 'string' && !isDangerousUrl(attr.value);
+      return true;
+    });
+  }
+};
+
+/**
+ * Strips script-execution vectors (script, MathML/SVG foreign content, event handlers,
+ * `javascript:`/`vbscript:` URLs) from a HAST/MDX tree. Custom components keep their
+ * `on*` props (React props, not DOM handlers) but have dangerous URL props stripped and
+ * are descended into to clean nested raw HTML.
+ */
+export const stripDangerousHtml = (tree: Root): void => {
+  visit(tree, (node, index, parent: Parent | undefined) => {
+    const name = elementName(node);
+
+    // Non-elements (root/text): descend without touching attributes.
+    if (name === null) return undefined;
+
+    // PascalCase components: keep `on*` props (React props, not DOM handlers), but still
+    // strip dangerous URL props — a component may forward `href`/`src` to a host element.
+    if (isComponentName(name)) {
+      cleanElement(node, false);
+      return undefined;
+    }
+
+    // Host element: drop it (and its subtree) wholesale if dangerous; SKIP continues at the
+    // same index, which now holds the next sibling shifted in by the splice.
+    if (DANGEROUS_TAG_NAMES.has(name.toLowerCase())) {
+      if (parent && typeof index === 'number') {
+        parent.children.splice(index, 1);
+        return [SKIP, index];
+      }
+      return undefined;
+    }
+
+    cleanElement(node, true);
+    return undefined;
+  });
+};
+
+/**
+ * Rehype plugin wrapping the deny-list stripper for the `mdxish` and MDX `compile`
+ * pipelines, which can't use the `md` allow-list because custom components must
+ * survive. Must run after raw HTML is parsed into nodes.
+ */
+const rehypeStripDangerousHtml = () => (tree: Root) => {
+  stripDangerousHtml(tree);
+  return tree;
+};
+
+export default rehypeStripDangerousHtml;