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Threat model

Honest scope for SysSpectogram on a single Linux VPS / host. This is not a claim of unkillable EDR.

Assets

Asset Why it matters
Host integrity (binaries, auth files, modules) Primary detection target
Alert evidence (jsonl, remote sinks) Forensics / paging
Model artifacts (cnn.onnx, scaler.json, iforest.ssf.npz) Integrity of detection
Agent UDS + HMAC secret Authenticity of agent alerts
Telegram / web unlock Authorization for SOAR actions

Adversaries

  1. Remote scanner / brute — noisy perimeter events.
  2. Foothold (non-root) — suspicious processes, egress, file touches.
  3. Local root on same host — can stop units, wipe local logs, replace binaries if they control install paths.
  4. Supply-chain tamper — swapped model pack or release binary before verify.

Entry points

  • guard / monitor process
  • Rust agent Unix socket
  • Telegram bot + live web (unlock-gated actions)
  • Model / state directories on disk
  • Alert sinks (file, syslog, HTTPS)

Controls

Control Mitigates
Default response.mode: observe Accidental auto-ban
Agent HMAC + PEERCRED PID allowlist + exe seal Forged critical UDS alerts
weights_only CNN load + pickle-free scaler/IF Malicious model deserialization
Optional supply_chain.enforce + minisign Tampered artifacts
FIM baseline + seal Quiet binary/config swap
Phoenix twin + Dead-man + remote sinks Silent agent kill (makes it louder)
kirk.auto_isolate* default off + CIDR gate Self-lockout
HTTPS/syslog sinks block private/link-local after DNS resolve SSRF via hostname / metadata

Residual risks (accepted)

  • Same-host root can still systemctl stop, delete local files, or rmmod an optional helper module.
  • Advanced kernel malware can lie about /proc without out-of-guest visibility (see VMI.md for v1.0 ceiling).
  • Telegram is a pager, not WORM storage — configure remote sinks for evidence off-box.
  • Optional DKMS sysspectogram_wd is a PID registry scaffold; many cloud kernels will not load it.

Non-goals

  • Guaranteed survival against hostile kernel/root
  • Full SIEM / enterprise SOAR
  • Built-in aggressive internet scanning
  • Windows / macOS agents

See also SECURITY.md, AGENT_PROTECT.md, SUPPLY_CHAIN.md, SUPPLY_CHAIN_STORY.md.