Topic: linux-resident-control
Status: accepted Ubuntu GNOME Wayland logged-in appliance; other compositors, protected login planes, and physical Linux hardware remain research-stage.
Current (2026-11-06), Tactical 159:
- Appliance resident: accepts common
deltaX/deltaY, dragx/yandapplicationId. - Desktop-product resident: projects
desktopState(includinglocked) and the commondeployment, closes channels after ordering and open failures, uses the common refusal codes, and refusespreparedConsolewithlocked_use_unsupported. - Host doctor maps
lockedand checks surface modes.
Current: Retained UTM appliances can explicitly select
LINUXVM_ADMIN_TRANSPORT=ssh after guest-agent host-key pinning. Root
administration and transfer then use pinned key-only SSH and appliance sudo;
UTM retains exact identity, lifecycle and address discovery. There is no
implicit transport fallback. The resident and its desktop contract stay the
same. See Tactical 090
for the accepted fresh retained-appliance run: bootstrap, seed removal,
disk-only cold boot, password verification, common conformance and the
platform pointer/keyboard smoke all passed.
The authoritative platforms/linux now
provides an accepted Ubuntu 24.04 GNOME 46 Wayland logged-in software-testing
surface. A persistent active-user resident exposes the same
machine-control/v0 Unix-socket contract to guest-local and outside callers.
It owns compact AT-SPI semantics, GNOME display and active-window capture,
argv-only user-systemd application lifecycle, generation-bound references,
and a bounded root appliance input broker available only to the active user.
The guarded corpus covers GNOME Shell, dock, top bar, notifications, Files, Settings, a file chooser, Polkit detection/cancellation, GTK, Qt/XWayland, Chromium, and custom-rendered visual fallback. It verifies independent application or OS effects and fails closed on every outer UTM-window capture or input operation. A full reboot restores both resident services and rejects pre-reboot references as stale.
Current: Tactical 018 re-proved the retained appliance without cloning or outer input. Its static device-activated QEMU guest-agent, GNOME auto-login, resident, semantics, capture, and input all returned after a boot-ID-changing reboot while outer UI remained prohibited. The same exact candidate reached a clean stopped promotion handoff and passed a disposable-marker outcome. A live restart also exposed and fixed the bounded provider race in which guest execution preceded UTM's first IPv4 result.
Current: Tactical 021 added and live-proved a Linux-native maintenance surface around that accepted shape. A nonce-bound minimized audit checks dpkg consistency, pending reboot, declared runtime/development packages, QEMU/SPICE support, the GNOME Wayland session, resident, input broker, and target-native status before the common doctor. Its exact-candidate repair changes only installed systemd startup invariants and keeps a missing guest agent as an explicit recovery boundary. On-demand certification audits without repair, uses the provider's changed-boot-ID reboot proof, runs an archive of exact committed source inside Ubuntu, cleans staging, and stops only after success. Dependency-light policy fixtures cover the current contract. The retained candidate passed an idempotent development-profile bootstrap, healthy audit and no-reboot repair, exact-source portable and Linux-native certification after a changed-boot-ID reboot, and a final outer-prohibited resident smoke cycle. No clone or workspace was used, and the appliance was left stopped.
Current:
Tactical 028 built a
separate native x86_64 Ubuntu 24.04 GNOME Wayland appliance under Linux
libvirt/QEMU/KVM. The same resident, AT-SPI, capture, input, fixture,
maintenance, exact-source certification, and local/outside contracts passed
without ordinary host-console access. A receipt-bound QCOW2 workspace proved
discard semantics, and the accepted base was left stopped and claim-free.
Current: The ARM64 UTM factory now runs unattended through UTM scripting alone, without reading UTM's sandbox container, and was proved end to end on a macOS controller whose own screen was locked: create, NoCloud first boot, cloud-init, resident bootstrap, seed detachment, restart, doctor, and two common conformance passes. The seed is a bundle-contained VirtIO disk; the EFI variable store is normalized by export and re-import; the seed disables idle lock and first-login setup. Doctor now reports a locked GNOME session, and clipboard text waits for selection ownership instead of racing the paste. See the Linux problem record.
Current: The Mac UTM factory now has a read-only precreation report for cloud-image shape, exact key-only NoCloud seed content, host tools, responsive UTM scripting, and unused destination. The claimed UTM candidate report now observes guest-agent and NoCloud completion, requires explicit completion attestation before stopped seed removal, and checks resident readiness and final stop. A fresh official ARM64 candidate passed stage-driven creation, bootstrap, two platform smoke runs around seed removal, and exact-source development-profile certification after a changed-boot-ID reboot. The final report marked it complete and stopped; the claim was released. UTM's silent cloud-init command is handled through read-only runtime records, including the disabled marker on later boots. See tactical 042.
Current: The native x86_64 KVM factory now has read-only precreation and claimed candidate stages for QCOW2/NoCloud inputs, exact destination, guest-agent and cloud-init readiness, resident bootstrap, seed removal, and clean stop. A fresh candidate passed the Linux smoke suite and changed-boot exact-source certification with portable and native checks, then stopped cleanly and released its claim.
Current: Tactical 048 recreates and promotes a disposable x86_64 appliance with an explicit stored password handoff. The key-only seed remains bootstrap-only; promotion verifies the canonical password against the guest and registers its private locator. Portable checks, native smoke, seed detachment, restart and final readiness pass; the retained VM is off and claim-free after consuming product tests. A separate RTC-scheduled suspend-to-idle experiment failed to return; guarded forced-stop and readiness recover it, without qualifying native sleep/wake. GUI password submission remains a distinct provider gap.
Current: Tactical 049 adds a private credential verifier and a required factory/promotion handoff. Password verification uses pinned setup SSH stdin and guest shadow-hash comparison; explicitly password-free profiles instead prove a locked entry. Both factory routes require current exact-target evidence before reporting promotion complete, and common promotion preparation verifies before shutdown and rechecks the receipt afterward. Operational readiness remains independent. Deterministic regression coverage is recorded in the tactical. The live command verifies the canonical stored password on an x64 appliance before and after reboot in Tactical 056; full factory promotion remains a separate acceptance case. This is not a GUI unlock implementation.
Decision: Keep this accepted GNOME Wayland profile stable while extending Linux through separate compositor and authority profiles. The target selector may change, but guest-local and outside callers should retain the same facade, capability, result, and reference vocabulary.
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Always discover the canonical stored appliance credential through private inventory before declaring login/unlock a human gate. The controller-local secret file is the source of truth; public guides contain only generic locator rules. See the credential contract. Stored disposable-VM credentials may be used unattended. Linux currently lacks a dedicated secret-safe password submission operation; distinguish that provider gap from missing credential metadata or a human-only step.
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Treat GNOME Wayland as a concrete platform profile, not generic “Linux.” Capability reports name the desktop session, compositor, XWayland use, portal state, and actual capture/input route.
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Reuse the owned facade and result concepts proven on Windows and macOS while keeping AT-SPI, D-Bus, PipeWire, portals, EIS/libei, and any dedicated appliance privilege explicit.
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Use the owned native resident as the default for this profile. It is deeper for measured Qt semantics and reliable Unicode input and does not require an interactive portal for dedicated-appliance input.
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Keep Cua 0.17.0 as an optional composed provider for its rich Chromium combined tree/image and GNOME Shell helper's arbitrary target-window capture. The measured gaps do not justify a fork.
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Report the input broker honestly as
root_test_appliance. It is deliberate dedicated-appliance authority, not same-user containment or a generic workstation route. -
Treat GNOME Settings' labelled but zero-bounds GTK 4 controls as a visual fallback: fixed display capture, target-local HID, and an independent
gsettingseffect. Do not invent semantic coordinates. -
A private or nested compositor may later be a valuable isolated test target, but it is not a prerequisite for proving the existing logged-in GNOME appliance.
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GDM, lock screen, encrypted preboot, and absent-user-session control are separate authority domains. They are not part of the first logged-in slice.
The native capture route supports the display and exact active window, not an arbitrary hidden window. Cua can supply arbitrary target-window capture when its GNOME Shell helper is deliberately installed. Portal/libei input is a viable bounded workstation route. The separate ordinary-user Linux desktop profile now has signed x64 GNOME consent, sharing-lifetime, effect and lifecycle acceptance; it never selects the appliance input broker.
GDM, lock screen, encrypted preboot, absent-user sessions, other compositors,
and physical hardware remain separate authority and compatibility profiles.
The completed execution record is
Tactical 012,
the maintenance execution record is
Tactical 021,
and exact differential evidence lives in the
Linux findings.