Topic: host-control
Status: signed Tauri preview accepted in ARM64 Tart. Earlier source-native setup/browser behavior has physical Mac evidence; full signed Tauri physical desktop acceptance remains open. Tactical 050 owns the first slice.
Run Machine Control on a physical computer the controller user owns, rather
than only on disposable VMs, and make it safe enough to install on a main
workstation. This covers the shared grant broker, deployment presets, the
menu bar application, local host targeting, and attended-away operation.
Browser control has its own topic, browser-control.
Current: Mac and Windows temporary pauses preserve otherwise valid authorization, with explicit Resume distinct from Stop. Polite activation, live waiting requests, existing Mac consent restoration and physical/VM resource semantics belong to access admission and pause.
The product aim is a less limited alternative to agent-coupled Computer Use tools: the whole desktop, including the Dock, menu bar, and system UI, gated by explicit, visible, revocable grants rather than by a fixed list of permitted applications.
Current: a shared Tauri operator app embeds the existing Swift resident. Signed/notarized Apple silicon and Intel CI candidates are verified; the exact ARM64 CI app and signed installed upgrade pass native Tart operator checks. Tactical 051 owns initial candidate evidence. Tactical 052 owns accepted production updates. The desktop matrix separates package, architecture, VM, and physical-host evidence. The earlier AppKit operator remains available for appliance bootstrap.
Current (2026-09-30): The source-native ad-hoc-signed Machine Control.app
(org.machine-control.app), built from the
resident package, serves Tart guests and
physical hosts. It runs as a per-user Aqua LaunchAgent on a mode-0600
socket and shows a menu bar item. A root-owned policy file selects the preset;
guests receive appliance, and a Mac without the file is a workstation.
Tart guests were migrated to it without outer input and pass resident
conformance apart from the Cua-dependent text cell, which the guest cannot run.
Current: Every operation passes the grant broker before any provider runs.
In a workstation instance inside the guest, capture, input, and browser calls
were refused with approval_required until a prompt was approved. Approval,
denial, timeout, manual arming from the menu, the Stop hotkey, revocation,
narrowing to view-only, and refusal of input aimed at the app's own status
item were observed live. Expiry, desktop-lock revocation, and prompt-time
pausing are covered by unit and socket-level tests.
Current: A setup checklist replaces the permissions submenu. It opens while macOS consent is missing, shows each grant's live state in plain terms, and opens the exact settings pane. A short-lived child process detects a new Screen Recording grant that the running app cannot see yet, and the app then restarts itself under its LaunchAgent. On the development Mac this flow granted both permissions; System Settings' own "Quit & Reopen" dialog still appears afterwards and is out of date, so the checklist tells the person to choose Later. Opening the bundle directly starts the LaunchAgent.
Current: The common client has a default host target
(macos-host-resident) with a local-socket adapter and grant request|status|revoke. CLI/doctor work with the signed Tauri resident in Tart.
A full signed-product desktop task through this adapter on a physical Mac
has not been established by the current acceptance records.
Current (2026-10-02): Public signed/notarized ARM64 0.4.8 now has a
bounded physical-Mac smoke test through the common host adapter: visible
macOS consent, off-state refusal, local Tauri approval, native AX button
action with an independent counter effect, exact-window Quartz capture,
and keyboard delivery to the fixture text field. Access was revoked and the
fixture and target-use claim were cleaned up. Concurrent human input means
exact text equality was not established. This is partial physical evidence;
browser, restart/update, lock, emergency Stop, and full product acceptance
remain open.
Current: The optional root unlock broker still authenticates the resident, not the original caller. Workstation policy refuses standalone protected operations; ordinary host installation installs no root helper. The separate locked-use opt-in installs a covered-session profile through native System Settings approval in Permissions and binds it to approved bounded control. The Settings checkbox only changes the preference.
Current: The Windows ordinary-user workstation host (Tactical 036) refuses protected operations but does not gate ordinary control behind an approval.
Decision: The standalone Windows app adds resident-enforced approvals in a distinct desktop instance while retaining the component profile. Its current workstream is Windows desktop, executed by Tactical 053.
Current: The Windows desktop profile now passes exact signed x64 VM grant/UI/lifecycle and local/outside CLI acceptance. The existing YA component retains its distinct authorization boundary. Windows desktop owns current status; Tactical 053 owns the execution record.
Decision: Runtime and presentation owns the agreed evolution to one reusable runtime with personal, minimal and appliance presentation in the same package. Presentation preferences remain independent of trusted authorization policy. Existing launch behavior remains current; Tactical 107 starts with nonblocking Mac status work before adding profile selection.
Decision: The desktop operator is a compact settings dialog. Use short labels, status rows, and direct controls; omit marketing copy, page subtitles, hero banners, and repeated explanations. Keep grant scope and same-user reach visible beside approval controls. The shared Tauri UI follows this direction.
Decision: One program serves VM guests and physical hosts. Both install the same application bundle, with the same code identity, resident, and menu bar; only the deployment policy differs. On a VM the policy grants standing access and the menu bar shows that; on a personal host it requires approval. Existing Tart guests move from the testbed identity to the shared one once, which needs a single renewal of macOS consent through the existing guest consent bootstrap.
Decision: Policy has two independent axes:
- Operation set.
ordinarycovers capture, semantic observation, actions, input, and application lifecycle.protectedadds unlock, administrator sheets, and credential entry. Operations outside the set are not registered. - Grant mode.
standingmeans the policy itself is the grant.approvalmeans each grant comes from an approver. Approvers are pluggable: local click first, then Touch ID, then out-of-band approval such as a phone or authenticator.
The named presets are combinations of these:
| Preset | Operation set | Grant mode | Intended installation |
|---|---|---|---|
appliance |
ordinary, plus protected when separately installed | standing | disposable VM guests; today's behavior |
unattended |
ordinary, plus protected when separately installed | standing, later out-of-band approval | dedicated physical machines, such as a headless mini desktop |
workstation |
ordinary | approval | a personal or shared computer |
Decision: Trusted installation policy selects the preset. The resident
reads a root-owned policy file and treats a missing, unreadable,
non-root-owned, or group/other-writable file as workstation. Request fields,
environment variables, arguments, and user-writable preferences cannot widen
it. On a personal machine this means that switching to a standing preset
requires an administrator password. That is not containment against an agent
that already has passwordless sudo.
Decision: Grants and target-use claims stay separate. A claim coordinates which agent uses a target; it is not authority and must not become a bearer credential. The resident may record the caller's claim ID with the grant in its audit log.
Decision: The grant check runs in the resident's operation dispatch, in the process that owns the macOS consent. A menu bar front end in front of an ungated socket would be bypassable by any same-user process. For the same reason, the macOS host application bundles the resident and its UI in one signed process.
Decision: The initial host application was native Swift/AppKit. It reused the
menu bar, login item, setup/repair/uninstall, and release patterns of
lid-awake, a sibling macOS utility with
a signed privileged helper. The grant and approval protocol lives in the
resident and contracts/, so a later cross-platform shell, for example Tauri
with the existing updater infrastructure, can replace the menu without moving
enforcement.
Decision: The desktop product moves to a shared Tauri operator UX and the existing desktop release infrastructure. The first Mac slice embeds the Swift resident in the Tauri native process as a framework, preserving grant checks, the permission owner, and same-process approval authority. It does not rewrite providers. Windows and a named Linux workstation profile follow their own acceptance gates. Tactical 051 owns packaging and exact signed-artifact validation.
Current: In the MVP, the workstation preset is off by default.
Decision: Every packaged desktop local operator can choose Until I turn it off when
manually enabling selected scopes. That in-memory grant has no timer and
reports lifetime: until_stopped with null expiry and remaining seconds.
Stop ends access; caller revocation does not end person-armed access (see
person-armed access). Session changes, pause and restart
follow the native platform rules. Windows/Linux gain no restart persistence
in this slice. Mac retains its separately implemented same-console/boot
consent restoration, which derives fresh grants and never restores old owners
or queue positions; access admission and pause
owns that behavior. Agent approval requests retain bounded durations; they
cannot create this lifetime through the public socket.
The shared UI exposes this choice only when the native operator advertises
support. Public 0.5.4 implements this on Windows and Linux, with focused signed
installed acceptance on Mac, Windows and Linux ARM64 VMs, including independent
fixture effects and Stop. Tactical 091
owns that release evidence. Existing platform pause/session behavior remains;
that slice does not add restart persistence. Public 0.4.9 passes signed ARM64
Tart checks for visible selection,
null expiry/countdown, selected scopes, independent fixture effect, Stop,
Restart with access off and retained permissions, and bounded agent approval.
Tactical 057 owns this
targeted acceptance. Signed lock/recovery and full physical acceptance remain open.
Current: Public desktop 0.6.4 implements origin-aware retention on Mac, Windows and Linux. Tactical 120 owns bounded installed evidence and remaining behavior checks; 121 owns exact production package authentication and delivery.
Current: Through public 0.6.1, any same-user socket caller's
grant.revoke ends whatever grant is active, including access the person
armed until stopped. On Mac it also deletes the saved operator consent and
suspends trusted callers, so the arming does not return after unlock or
restart. An agent following the host skill's former "revoke when finished"
step disarmed a person's indefinite access this way and nobody was told.
Windows has the same unconditional revoke. Separately, a timed agent grant
approved while person-armed access is active replaces it, and that grant's
expiry also deletes the saved consent.
Decision: Every grant records its origin. person grants come from the
local operator (app, menu, restored consent); request grants come from an
approved agent request. Mac, Windows and Linux implement it
(Tactical 120 records the
installed evidence and what remains).
- A caller's
grant.revokeof apersongrant is a no-op that succeeds withrevoked: falseandretained: "person_armed". Agents run revoke in cleanup, so a refusal would invite retries and workarounds. - A caller's
grant.revokeof arequestgrant ends it, as before. - Caller revocation, and the end of any
requestgrant, never deletes saved operator consent or suspends trusted callers. The person's arming returns when the request grant ends. - Only the person's own controls (Stop in the app or menu, the hotkey, Settings) end person-armed access and clear its saved consent. A later agent-initiated disarm, if wanted, must be a request the person confirms in native UI, never a plain CLI flag.
- Grant status reports
origin.
Proposal: Notify the person when access ends for any reason other than
their own Stop, naming the reason and caller, and refuse server.stop from
ordinary socket callers on personal hosts.
Open: This prevents accidental disarming. A deliberate same-user agent with a shell can still quit the app or edit its state; that needs a separate OS identity. Tactical 120 tracks Mac, Windows and Linux implementation and validation.
- An agent requests a scope (
observe,control, orbrowser), a duration, and a free-text reason withgrant request. The request blocks until approval, denial, or a bounded timeout. - The prompt shows the reason and the caller's kernel peer process and parent chain, labelled unverified. The approver may grant a narrower scope or a shorter duration.
- Ordinary operations without a live grant fail fast with
approval_requiredinstead of opening a prompt on every call. - An active grant changes the menu bar indicator and records operations in a bounded recent-actions list. Stop in the menu or a global hotkey revokes it immediately. Expiry, revocation, resident restart, and session or desktop transitions invalidate it along with outstanding element references.
- While a prompt is visible, the resident refuses all synthetic input, and it always refuses actions targeting its own windows, so a controlled session cannot approve itself.
Open: An MVP grant arms the whole target, not only the requester. While it is active, any same-user process can use it. The CLI opens a new connection per request, so the caller shown in the prompt informs the approver and the audit log but does not bind the grant. Caller authorization owns the Desktop-first plan for automatically granting bounded access to a trusted integration. Native executable identity has a bounded validation result; the real broker, authenticated session channel and revocation remain pending. No target-wide grant becomes session-bound through advertisement.
Open: Other same-user programs with Accessibility permission can still click a click-approval prompt. Touch ID approval (LocalAuthentication) removes that path and is the planned second approver.
Decision: The limit remains the one stated in
architecture: gating Machine
Control does not sandbox an agent that already has an unrestricted shell as
the same user.
Decision: the first Mac version uses a persistent, default-off locked-use setting, native helper approval in Permissions, ordinary access approval, and a bounded active control session. The person locks normally; temporary unlock occurs behind covers. Physical input relocks, revokes access, and pauses automatic unlock until manual unlock. Keep the Mac awake with its lid open.
The sibling macOS locked-use topic owns current scope, implementation, and acceptance. Tactical 064 records execution. This follows OpenAI's documented locked-use experience; Machine Control owns its explicit task connection and completion semantics. No stored login password is used.
Open: closed-lid operation remains deferred. Determine whether a closed built-in display without an external display retains a capturable WindowServer display, and whether to coordinate with lid-awake rather than take ownership of its sleep policy. Neither sleep prevention nor virtual displays belongs to this first implementation.
Current, unreleased source (2026-10-29): shared form choices persist independently of authorization and seed existing Mac installations from original operator choices. Stop retains selections while removing consent. Focused UI and native invariants pass; bounded signed development-package Mac VM trials restore all four scopes and indefinite consent after clean quit and crash. Tactical 142 records visible Stop/relaunch and actual reboot choices, including locked-browser preference, with pre-boot access off. This does not establish a new logout/reboot authorization policy or explain every reported loss of effective access.
High priority: investigate caller authorization before treating target-wide arming as suitable for isolating agent sessions. This promotes the previously deferred connection-bound grant concern; the linked topic owns the investigation and acceptance requirements.
- Finish Tactical 050: install on the development Mac with the person granting macOS consent, approving prompts, and loading the unpacked extension.
- The
unattendedpreset on a dedicated physical machine. - Away mode: curtain, presence guard, relock, then closed lid.
- Touch ID and out-of-band approvers.
- Remote callers of a physical host over SSH or YepAnywhere, with prompts that identify remote callers.
- Shared Tauri desktop UX, Developer ID signing, notarization, and the
Desktop Release Kit update contract; the
personal-machine support statement in
SECURITY.md. - The same model on Windows, reusing the ordinary workstation host.