Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
58 lines (48 loc) · 3.47 KB

reverse-password.md

File metadata and controls

58 lines (48 loc) · 3.47 KB

ReversePassword authentication samples

Current (2026-10-18), source-reviewed: ReversePassword includes a Windows credential provider, a NoPasswordAuthPkg LSA authentication package and test clients. Its relevant source illustrates authentication without validating or retrieving the Windows password. It is not a qualified unlock provider. The spike audit owns the exact revision, source paths and investigation limits.

License and architecture

The repository declares MIT. The authentication-package README acknowledges EIDAuthentication ancestry; complete lineage and narrower inherited obligations have not been audited. No code has been adopted or redistributed. Any reuse requires that audit and a fresh review at the intended revision.

The credential provider selects the installed custom package and serializes credentials to it. Inside LSA, the sample checks for a removable-media marker file instead of checking the account password. It constructs token/profile information and a new LSA logon session. This separates a sign-in UI extension from the component that actually authorizes authentication.

Reach and limits

Capability Evidence and limit
Non-password local authentication logic source-reviewed; marker-file authorization, not a cryptographic grant
Credential-provider submission to custom package source-reviewed; selected package is carried in serialization
Existing-session unlock Unverified; the package allows Interactive/RemoteInteractive, rejects other logon types and creates a new LSA logon LUID
Same session, account, DPAPI and application continuity Unverified; a successful standalone token/logon would not establish this
Current Windows x64 Project configurations found; not built or live-tested here
ARM64 No reviewed build configuration or acceptance
Protected LSASS README requires LSA protection off; no acceptable product deployment evidence
Semantic control, capture and input Not implemented; would compose with the resident and independent cover/relock guardian

The marker file authorizes too broadly, input handling is not a hostile-buffer reference, and profile/account-policy behavior is incomplete. Do not install the sample or inherit its authorization model. Microsoft-signed LSA loading, Credential Guard compatibility and safe rollback are separate gaps.

Fit and next evidence

Decision: retain the source as an architecture reference for the deferred Windows password-free investigation, with no adoption decision. An owned package would need to consume a cryptographically authenticated, one-use grant for one already logged-in account/session and refuse every other context. It must preserve stock sign-in options, account restrictions, ordinary consent, finite ownership and independent relock.

Open: Does a minimal, correctly signed package actually unlock the existing password-created console session, without account-secret material, and retain its original WTS identity/logon plus DPAPI functionality? That native effect and Microsoft signing eligibility are the first gates. The Windows platform comparison owns alternatives; the protected-unlock topic owns the resulting direction.