Current (2026-10-18), source-reviewed:
ReversePassword includes a Windows
credential provider, a NoPasswordAuthPkg LSA authentication package and test
clients. Its relevant source illustrates authentication without validating or
retrieving the Windows password. It is not a qualified unlock provider.
The spike audit
owns the exact revision, source paths and investigation limits.
The repository declares MIT. The authentication-package README acknowledges EIDAuthentication ancestry; complete lineage and narrower inherited obligations have not been audited. No code has been adopted or redistributed. Any reuse requires that audit and a fresh review at the intended revision.
The credential provider selects the installed custom package and serializes credentials to it. Inside LSA, the sample checks for a removable-media marker file instead of checking the account password. It constructs token/profile information and a new LSA logon session. This separates a sign-in UI extension from the component that actually authorizes authentication.
| Capability | Evidence and limit |
|---|---|
| Non-password local authentication logic | source-reviewed; marker-file authorization, not a cryptographic grant |
| Credential-provider submission to custom package | source-reviewed; selected package is carried in serialization |
| Existing-session unlock | Unverified; the package allows Interactive/RemoteInteractive, rejects other logon types and creates a new LSA logon LUID |
| Same session, account, DPAPI and application continuity | Unverified; a successful standalone token/logon would not establish this |
| Current Windows x64 | Project configurations found; not built or live-tested here |
| ARM64 | No reviewed build configuration or acceptance |
| Protected LSASS | README requires LSA protection off; no acceptable product deployment evidence |
| Semantic control, capture and input | Not implemented; would compose with the resident and independent cover/relock guardian |
The marker file authorizes too broadly, input handling is not a hostile-buffer reference, and profile/account-policy behavior is incomplete. Do not install the sample or inherit its authorization model. Microsoft-signed LSA loading, Credential Guard compatibility and safe rollback are separate gaps.
Decision: retain the source as an architecture reference for the deferred Windows password-free investigation, with no adoption decision. An owned package would need to consume a cryptographically authenticated, one-use grant for one already logged-in account/session and refuse every other context. It must preserve stock sign-in options, account restrictions, ordinary consent, finite ownership and independent relock.
Open: Does a minimal, correctly signed package actually unlock the existing password-created console session, without account-secret material, and retain its original WTS identity/logon plus DPAPI functionality? That native effect and Microsoft signing eligibility are the first gates. The Windows platform comparison owns alternatives; the protected-unlock topic owns the resulting direction.